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JINNAH

AND

THE MAKING OF A NATION

جناب ح اینڈ بیڈنگ آف اے نیشن

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To conclude, a constitution must be evolved that recognises that there are in India two nations who both must share the governance of their common motherland. In evolving such a constitution, the Muslims are ready to cooperate with the British Government, the Congress or any party so that the present enmities may cease and India may take its place amongst the great countries of the world.



the vast majority of the elected representatives will be illiterate Hindus, the constituent assembly will be under the influence of Mr. Gandhi and the Congress leaders, and the constitution that will emerge will be as the Working Committee direct?

Thus, through the constituent assembly, will the Working Committee attain its ends. British control and commerce will disappear; the Indian States will be abolished! Minority opposition will be stifled and a great Hindu nation will emerge, governed by its beloved leader Mr. Gandhi and the Congress Working Committee.

We have now considered the disease and the symptoms. What is the remedy?

(1) The British people must realise that unqualified Western democracy is totally unsuited for India and attempts to impose it must cease.

(2) In India, it must be accepted that 'party' government is not suitable and all Governments, Central or provincial, must be governments that represent all sections of the people.

In this connection the All-India Muslim League has laid down the following broad principles:—

(1) That the British Government should review and revise the entire problem of India's future constitution *de novo* in the light of the experience gained by the working of the present provincial constitution, and developments that have taken place since 1939 or which may take place hereafter.

(2) While the Muslim League stands for a free India, it is irrevocably opposed to any federal objective which must necessarily result in a majority community rule, under the guise of democracy and parliamentary system of government.

(3) No declaration regarding the question of constitutional advance for India should be made without the consent and approval of the All-India Muslim League, nor any constitution be framed and finally adopted by His Majesty's Government and the British Parliament without such consent and approval.



In the six Hindu provinces a *Kulturkampf* was inaugurated. Attempts were made to have *Bande Mataram*, the Congress party song, recognized as the national anthem, the party flag recognized as the national flag, and the real national language, Urdu, supplanted by Hindi. Everywhere oppression commenced and complaints poured in such force into the Muslim League's central office that the Pirpur Committee, whose report is available, was appointed to investigate these grievances. Such overwhelming evidence was collected that the Muslims, despairing of the Viceroy and the Governors ever taking action to protect them, have lately been forced to ask for a Royal Commission to investigate their grievances.

Such was the position on the eve of the resignation of the Congress Ministries, a position over which the British people might well ponder. Is it their desire that India should become a totalitarian Hindu State with the Central and all the provincial Governments responsible, not to their legislatures or to the electorate but to a caucus unknown to the Constitution, the Working Committee of the Congress. They may rest assured that such will be the inevitable result if the Congress demand for the right of framing India's constitution through a constituent assembly is conceded.

Let us consider briefly the implications of this nebulous and impracticable constituent assembly. To commence with, the question arises, why is this demand made at this particular time? The answer is obvious. The war is to the Working Committee a heaven-sent means of increasing its rule from over eight provinces to over the whole of India, state and province. If the British Government are stampeded and fall into the trap under of the stress of critical situation created by the war, India will face a crisis the result of which no man could prophesy, and I feel certain that Muslim India will never submit to such a position and will be forced to resist it with every means in their power.

And of what type of constitutionalists will this constituent assembly consist? There are in India roughly four hundred million souls who, through no fault of their own, are hopelessly illiterate and consequently priest and caste-ridden. They have no real conception of how they are being governed even today, and it is proposed that to the elected representatives of such, India's future constitution should be entrusted. Is it too much to say that since



The instructions seemed to be in two parts. In the first the Governor was instructed to use 'his best endeavours to select' as Ministers '...persons (including, as far as practicable, members of important minority communities)...'. The spirit underlying these words was clear. It was to secure for important minorities a Minister who commanded their confidence, and since there was no difference in the political programmes of the Congress and Muslim League parties in the legislatures, there was no reason why it was not 'practicable' for a Muslim League member to be appointed a Minister.

But what about the last line? 'In so acting, he shall bear constantly in mind the need for fostering a sense of joint responsibility among his Ministers.' This, fortunately, could be turned to suit their purpose if the Governor was prepared to allow this second part, advisory and subsidiary to the main instruction, to overrule the first. They had but to claim that joint responsibility was impossible unless the Muslim Minister was prepared to abide by the decisions of the Working Committee and their point was won. Meekly the Governors acquiesced and in order to allow the Congress to deceive the public by making it appear that it was 'national' and looking after the interests of the minorities by including a 'representative' of them in the Council of Ministers, accepted as Muslim Ministers individuals who by no stretch of imagination could be regarded as 'representatives' of the Muslim community and who, by signing the Congress pledge, were responsible to the Working Committee alone. Victory number two.

Surprised by such easy victories, the Congress became intoxicated with power. The Working Committee arrogated to itself the position of a parallel Central Government to whom the provincial Governments were responsible. Regional dictators were appointed, and the Ministers were entirely subject to their orders generally, and no provincial legislation could be enacted without their approval. They then proceeded to stifle even the little opposition that existed. Having dealt with the British, they now dealt with the Muslims.

An India-wide attack on the Muslims was launched. In the five Muslim provinces every attempt was made to defeat the Muslim-led coalition Ministries and by offering local political leaders Ministerships and other inducements, Congress Ministries came into power in at least two more provinces, the N. W. F. P. and Assam.



they were, were led by the small but solid blocks of Muslim League members.

This situation had two very unsatisfactory aspects. First, it brought out the completely Hindu composition of the Congress and, secondly, it would be difficult to ignore and override Muslim-led oppositions as long as the Governors of provinces were in possession of special powers granted to safeguard the minority interest.

Realizing at once that such circumstances would considerably hinder their plans, the Congress played its trump card. It refused to accept office. To the consternation of the Muslims and other minorities, overnight, the Viceroy and the Governors became supplicants. What would the Congress have them do? What assurances did the Congress need? The answer was ready: Give us the undertaking that you will not exercise your special powers and we will accept office. Hastily, the constitutional guardians of minority and other rights jettisoned their trust and amidst much mutual appreciation of each other's 'statesmanship' the Congress and the British Government came into political alliance. Victory number one. But there was still that troublesome first point. The whole game would be up if purely Hindu Governments took office and in at least three of the six provinces not a single Muslim had been returned on the Congress ticket and not more than one or two in the others. But what of it? Surely, there must be at least one amongst the Muslim members who would be unable to resist the bait of a Ministership. They would offer the Ministership provided he signed the Congress pledge.

But would the Governor agree to this 'camouflage'? What did his Instrument of Instructions advise? 'In making appointments to his Council of Ministers our Governor shall use his best endeavours to select his Ministers in the following manner, that is to say, to appoint in consultation with the person who in his judgment is most likely to command a stable majority in the legislature those persons (including, so far as practicable, members of important minority communities) who will best be in a position collectively to command the confidence of the legislature. In so acting, he shall bear constantly in mind the need for fostering a sense of responsibility among his Ministers.'

Anxiously the Working Committee analysed the implications.



The British people, being Christians, sometimes forget the religious wars of their own history and to-day consider religion as a private and personal matter between man and God. This can never be the case in Hinduism and Islam, for both these religions are definite social codes which govern not so much man's relation with his God as man's relation with his neighbour. They govern not only his law and culture but every aspect of his social life, and such religions, essentially exclusive, completely preclude that merging of identity and unity of thought, on which Western democracy is based, and inevitably bring about vertical rather than the horizontal divisions that democracy envisages.

Western democracy is totally unsuited for India and its imposition on India is the disease in the body politic. Let us now consider the inevitable symptoms. Led by an astute Hindu politician of the first rank, Mr. Gandhi, the Congress (which is mainly a Hindu body) had long foreseen that in the Western form of democracy lay the fulfilment of their hopes of a permanent all-India dominance. All their efforts and energies had, therefore, been bent towards securing for India a completely democratic form of government, and they realised that the new constitution would bring their goal immeasurably nearer if it could be worked on the lines chalked out by their leader and the Working Committee. Therefore, while crying that the new constitution was thoroughly unsatisfactory and totally unacceptable, the Congress decided to contest the elections held before its inauguration and, as was inevitable, secured complete majorities in the six Hindu provinces of India, namely, Bombay, Madras, the U. P., the C. P., Bihar and Orissa. The Congress, however, was as completely defeated in the five Muslim provinces, namely, Bengal, the Punjab, Sind, N. W. F. P. and Assam and even in the Hindu provinces failed to capture any appreciable number of seats in non-Hindu constituencies, particularly the Muslim electorates.

This, undoubtedly, was an unsatisfactory situation for a self-styled 'national' party and the exposure of its communal character seemed imminent. Rushing to Wardha for guidance, the Working Committee took stock. What was the position? In five provinces they had been defeated and while they held a complete majority in six, the Oppositions, weak in numbers though



permanent, and he, therefore, felt that the minorities' opposition to Federation on the assumption that, from the outset, power would be in the hands of an irremovable majority, was untenable. But he forgot that the whole concept of democracy postulates a single people, divided however much economically, and he might well have started his study of Indian problems by consulting the report of the Joint Select Committee on Indian Constitutional Reforms (Sessions 1933-34, Vol. 1, para 1):

“India is inhabited by many races... often as distinct from one another in origin, tradition and manner of life as are the nations of Europe. Two-thirds of its inhabitants profess Hinduism in one form or another as their religion, over 77 millions are followers of Islam; and the difference between the two is not only of religion in the stricter sense, but also of law and culture. They may be said, indeed, to represent two distinct and separate civilizations. Hinduism is distinguished by the phenomenon of its caste, which is the basis of its religious and social system, and, save in a very restricted field, remains unaffected by contact with the philosophies of the West: the religion of Islam, on the other hand, is based upon the conception of the equality of man.”

Perhaps no truer description of India has been compressed into a paragraph, and, without this background, no understanding of Indian problems is possible. The British people must realise that Hinduism and Islam ‘represent two distinct and separate civilisations’ and moreover, are ‘as distinct from one another in origin, tradition and manner of life as are the nations of Europe’.

They are in fact two different nations and if this fact is accepted by no less an authority than the Joint Select Committee, the Muslim people have cause to question the wisdom of the British Government in forcing on India the Western system of democracy without the qualifications and limitations to which the system must be subject to make it at all suitable for Indian conditions. If, therefore, it is accepted that there is in India a major and a minor nation, it follows that a parliamentary system based on the majority principle must inevitably mean the rise of the major nation. Experience has proved that, whatever the economic and political programme of any political party, the Hindu, as a general rule, will vote for his caste-fellow and the Muslim for his co-religionist.



## APPENDIX II

(Jinnah's article published in "Time and Tide", London, 19 January 1940)

The constitutional maladies from which India at present suffers may best be described as symptoms of a disease inherent in the body politic. Without diagnosing the disease, no understanding of the symptoms is possible and no remedy can suggest itself. Let us, therefore, first diagnose the disease, then consider the symptoms and finally arrive at the remedy.

What is the political future of India? The declared aim of the British Government is that India should enjoy Dominion Status in accordance with the Statute of Westminster in the shortest practicable time. In order that this end should be brought about, the British Government, very naturally, would like to see in India the form of democratic constitution it knows best and thinks best, under which the Government of the country is entrusted to one or other political party in accordance with the turn of the elections.

Such, however is the ignorance about Indian conditions among even the members of the British Parliament that, in spite of all the experience of the past, it is even yet not realised that this form of government is totally unsuited to India. Democratic systems based on the concept of a homogeneous nation such as England are very definitely not applicable to heterogeneous countries such as India, and this simple fact is the root cause of all of India's constitutional ills.

Even as Under-Secretary of State for India, the late Lt.-Col. Muirhead failed to appreciate this fact for, deploring the present communal tension, he expressed the opinion that the tendency on the part of both, those in power and those in opposition, was to consider that what the position now was would be the position always. He deplored the failure of Indians to appreciate an essential feature of democratic government—namely, the majority and minority are never



placate those who have the greatest nuisance value in the political and economic fields. Give up this dominant feature of your policy and the character of your policy of trying to get on with those who do not want to get on with you.

If the Government want the wholehearted co-operation of Muslim India, they must place their cards on the table. The Government must resort to the policy of action and give up, once and for all, its policy of inaction.

Ladies and Gentlemen: We cannot always succeed in settling vital or grave problems, problems affecting life and death, by merely making speeches on this platform or by exposing our opponents and our enemies. The only weapon that you have to forge—and the sooner you forge the better—is to create your own strength, your own power and make your organisation so complete that you can face any danger, any power, any opponent, any enemy, singly or combined together.



in the Congress leadership. This is so far as the Congress is concerned.

So far as the Hindu Mahasabha is concerned, I think it is an absolutely incorrigible and hopeless organisation. I will give you one specimen of their statesmanship. Mr. Savarkar, President of the Hindu Mahasabha, sent a message to the Sikh Conference in Karachi in which he urged them to take their due share in the arms and defence and added later that when the Muslims wake up from their daydreams of Pakistan, they shall see established Sikhistan in the Punjab. Mr. Savarkar says: "When the Sikhs were but a handful they ruled the majority in the Punjab and right upto Kabul. Now they have grown into millions, they can never be and need not be overawed by the now reduced Muslim majority relatively to their former strength." Mr. Savarkar has urged the Sikhs to establish Sikhistan in the Punjab. He not only talks of Hindudom and Hindu Nation and Hindu Raj but he also urges upon the Sikhs to establish Sikhistan. Mr. Savarkar is not an ordinary man. He is the President of the Hindu Mahasabha.

I next refer to what Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru's paper has written on the 30th of March. The paper said:—"On two things there shall be no compromise. There shall never be any division of India to suit the ambitions of fanatics. It shall always be 'akhand Bharat' and 'vishal Bharat.' It should be democracy, meaning majority rule." These are only samples to show how the Congress and the Hindu Mahasabha leaders think. When we talk about Pakistan we are called fanatics; but when they talk about Hindudom, Hindu Raj for the whole of India they call themselves liberals and nationalists....

I think I have taken much more of your time than I thought I would. I think I can wind up on a note of real warning to the British Government, because, after all, they are in possession of this land and the Government of this sub-continent. Please stop your policy of appeasement towards those who are bent upon frustrating your war efforts and doing their best to oppose the prosecution of the war and the defence of India at this critical moment. Do you want at this moment to place them in a superior and dominant position now and after the war? Change the corner-stone of your policy in this country. You are not loyal to those who are willing to stand by you and sincerely desire to support you but you desire to



freedom of India unconditionally and the future constitution, the final constitution, to be framed after the war, but the provisional constitution should be a National Government, at the Centre, responsible to the Legislature. That was the Poona proposal and Mr. Gandhi, of course, was thrown overboard. And Mr. Kripalani, Secretary of the All India Congress Committee, said that they went to the length of selling their leader. They sold their leader and *ahimsa*, which was their creed, was also buried in the city of Poona, because the Congress was ready to assist the British in the prosecution of the war and the defence of India. What was *haram*, as we say, at Wardha, became *halal* at Poona.

The Congress found that this was not going to wash either, because nobody was going to be deceived by this sort of thing. They were only deceiving themselves.

This was followed by the 'sporting offer' of Mr. Rajagopalachari, that genius of your province, who does some wonderful things at times. He said that in this National Government that we are proposing we are willing that Mr. Jinnah should be the Prime Minister and let him form his own Cabinet as he likes. This, one more strategy on the part of the Congress, failed to deceive the Muslims....

Babu Rajendra Prasad was asked only a few days ago (April 10) about the Pakistan scheme. He said the Working Committee of the Congress never discussed the Pakistan scheme as that was never referred to it by Mr. Jinnah. Do you believe that the Working Committee of the Congress never discussed the scheme? This ghost—Pakistan—has been haunting them since March 1940. What standard of truth is this?

Every Congress leader has discussed, issued statements and written volumes about Pakistan. Babu Rajendra Prasad has actually issued a pamphlet with regard to the Pakistan scheme in which he came out with his view and he says it was never discussed by the Working Committee because Mr. Jinnah never referred it! I say to Babu Rajendra Prasad: Ask your Working Committee to discuss it if they have not already done so. I say not only discuss it but apply your mind to it honestly and without prejudice and without silly sentiment, if there is any political wisdom or statesmanship still left



What is the demand of the Congress? The demand is the declaration of immediate and unconditional independence and freedom of India, with power to the people of India by a Constituent Assembly to be elected by adult franchise to frame their own constitution—of course, to the satisfaction of the minorities. How that will be brought about, Heaven alone knows. I don't know. This was the demand of the Congress and when they found it was not going to wash—the British Government ought to be grateful to the Muslim League for saving them the maximum amount of trouble the Congress was determined to give them, and I believe that in their heart of hearts the British people were grateful to the Muslim League—they thought of a flanking movement.

The Muslims know that if the Congress demand is conceded it will mean complete destruction of the Muslims. Therefore, naturally, the Muslim League opposed it tooth and nail along with other minorities like the Scheduled Classes, Christians, etc. Mr. Gandhi and his Congressmen did not know what to do. The result was that Mr. Gandhi and the Congress found, to their unexpected astonishment, a strong opposition to the Congress demand. So the Congress thought that if they could not get what they wanted by a frontal attack, they should try a flanking movement.

What was the flanking movement? I say, another resolution. As soon as the Congress passed a resolution, there would be commentators and interpreters. The explanation of the meaning of a resolution would go on for weeks and weeks and by the time the commentators had finished, yards and yards of statements would have been issued.

They went from Poona to Delhi, Delhi to Bombay and Bombay to Wardha.

So when they found that the Muslim League was the power which was holding up their diabolical machinations they tried the flanking movement at Poona, in place of the frontal attack. The change in Poona was only a change in name. The flanking movement was a plan and a strategy which was designed at Poona under the great General. The Congress was willing to throw over-board the General, Mr. Gandhi, provided the British Government will do this, namely, make a declaration of immediate independence and the



This is nothing but wishful thinking on the part of those who have put their feet so deep in the mire that they want now to find some excuse to impute a change upon a party, which had never changed from the very beginning. Why not say honestly and frankly that you have committed a blunder, that you are also willing to come into line and be done with it.

But this vicious propaganda and wicked method being pursued and the way in which we are harrassed is not only affecting the Press and the public of this country but to my amazement and astonishment even the British Press is misled. The British Press, amongst them, one of the best informed papers, the *London Times*, to my utter astonishment, this is what it says. I quote a few lines from the *London Times* of April 1: "While these proposals encountered much opposition in various quarters it is significant that the most general Press comment on them is that they offer a fresh opportunity for re-examining the political situation. Mr. Jinnah's recent statement in the Central Assembly that the Muslim League would co-operate in the reconstituted Executive provided his scheme of partitioning British India is considered after the war may make it easier for the two chief Indian parties to reach some temporary understanding." Well, I can only say to the doyen of British newspapers that this is only ingratitude stronger than traitor's arms. Why do we not make the demand for Pakistan here and now? Only one reason, because we do not want to embarrass the British Government when they are engaged in a struggle of life and death of their own existence. That is why we said that so soon as circumstances permit or after the war, the whole problem of India's constitution should be examined *de novo*. Instead of the British Government acknowledging this as an honourable attitude on our part, worthy of our tradition, I find that even the British papers are playing into the hands of the Congress and the Hindu propaganda....

Let us now examine what the Congress wants. The Congress has taken up a position about which there is absolutely no doubt. I would like to ask any man with a grain of sense, do you really think that Gandhi, the supreme leader, commander and general of the Congress, has started this satyagraha merely for the purpose of getting liberty of speech? Don't you really feel that this is nothing but a weapon of coercion and blackmailing the British, who are in a tight corner, to surrender and concede the Congress demand?



## APPENDICES

of the rapid developments in Europe and of the grave danger that is facing India it is fully realised that everything should be done that is possible to mobilise all the resources of India for the purpose of maintaining internal security, peace and tranquillity and to ward off external aggression. But this can only be done provided the British Government are ready and willing to associate Muslim leadership as equal partners in the Government both at the Centre and in the provinces. In all provinces Muslim leadership should be fully treated as equals and with equal share in the authority and control of the Government, Central and provincial. Provisionally, during the period of war, the following steps should be taken to comply with formal co-operation with the Government with equal share in the authority of the Government. Now I want you to follow this. What is that we suggested in July 1940? Is it that the Executive Council of the Viceroy should be enlarged within the framework of the present constitution and existing law? No, it should be settled by further discussion, it being understood that the Muslim representation should be equal to that of the Hindus, if the Congress comes in, otherwise they should have the majority of the additional numbers as it is obvious that the main burden and responsibility will be borne by the Muslims in that case. Then we said that in the provinces where Section 93 operates non-official advisers should be appointed. The number should be fixed after discussion and the majority of the non-official advisers should be representatives of Muslims. Where provinces can be run by combination of parties, naturally it will be for the parties concerned to adjust the matter by agreements. Then we suggested a war council which was mainly intended to give a share and a place of status to the Indian Princes and States for the purpose of intensifying war efforts and prosecuting war successfully, because they would not come in the Executive Council of the Governor-General.

Let us compare that with what the Congressmen say. The Congress Press and some Congressmen are often saying that Muslims are friends of imperialism. It seems to me that when they do not find any argument to adduce against the claims of the Musslamans, they abuse us....

Did we say anywhere that we should have Pakistan here and now. But people who were not wanting Pakistan, misinterpreted things and said the Pakistan issue is postponed, it is now put aside.



that necessarily they approve of the actions of the Congress but really if anybody really represented Hindu India it was the Congress.

In fact, you remember, a year before, when there was a likelihood of the war breaking out, the Congress Working Committee sat in vigilance at Delhi for days and days, because, as they were giving out openly, that will be the chance of their lives when they will be able to coerce the British Government successfully and wrench from them what they desired to take.

We knew that this powerful organisation, Congress, was waiting and watching and we, therefore, wanted the British to make the position clear with regard to this—this is the second point that I am discussing—the future constitution of India. We demanded that no constitutional change, interim or final, should be made without the approval and consent of Muslim India. This, after long-drawn correspondence and interviews, we have practically got, as announced in the declaration of the Viceroy of 8th August and amplified by Mr. Amery, the Secretary of State, in his pronouncement on behalf of His Majesty's Government on 14th August.... What does it come to? It comes to nothing else but justice to 90 millions of Muslims... It means that in framing a constitution the Muslim League is a constituent factor and that constituent factor must approve of the constitution that is to be made. How else are you going to frame a constitution without the approval and consent of a constituent factor—of 90 millions or 100 millions people of this country. Therefore it is not a question of veto or charter of intransigence but it is justice that we are recognized as a constituent factor and the British Government rightly say that you must come to your own agreement.

His Excellency the Viceroy asked me to see him in July 1940. This was the note submitted by me then: No pronouncement or statement should be made by His Majesty's Government which would in any way militate against the basic and fundamental principles laid down by the Lahore resolution on the division of India and creation of Muslim States in the North-Western and Eastern Zones and it may be stated that the ideal has now become the universal faith of Muslim India, and that His Majesty's Government must give definite and categorical assurance to the Muslims of India that no interim or final constitution will be adopted by the British Government without the consent and approval of Muslim India. In view



deadlock....Who is to be blamed for this deadlock? You know perfectly well that from the commencement of the declaration of the war in which we were involved, whether we approved of it or not, whether we liked it or not, we were involved and we became a belligerent country. You know the events that are taking place day after day, week after week, and we are naturally fully conscious of the interest of our own country, the defence of our country. To safeguard our homes and hearths was no doubt our uppermost consideration. From the beginning of the outbreak of war we made clear our position. It is not my merely saying it, but it has been made clear by the Working Committee, the Council of the All-India Muslim League and, finally, the full session of the All-India Muslim League. What was the position that we took up. That may be described about as shortly as I can. When this war broke out the first relief and the good news along with bad news of the war, that we got was that His Excellency the Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, in his very first interview immediately after the war, told me that His Majesty's Government were pleased to suspend the all-India federal scheme, embodied in the Government of India Act of 1935. Mind you it was only suspended, for we know how our British friends are capable in the science and game of diplomacy and we know that what was suspended may again be established at any time. Therefore, our first and foremost demand was this: Not only suspension but it must be abandoned. After long-drawn correspondence and interviews, ultimately the British Government declared that the whole problem of India's future constitution will be considered *de novo*, including the policy and plan on which the Government of India Act of 1935 was based. Now that was indeed a great relief. Because, remember, it was that disruptive Federal Government embodied in the Act of 1935 and against which Muslim India was fighting from the very commencement, and when that was knocked out, it was an enormous relief to us.

Well, the next thing that we were afraid of was that as we, the Muslims, are weak in the matter of our organization, the Muslim League in spite of all its efforts was not so strong as the Congress. The Congress, I may tell you, means nothing more and nothing less than the solid body of Hindus behind it and other off-shoots and the other bodies and branches like the Hindu Mahasabha and the All-India Hindu League, Liberal Federation and other small little bits, you know are all one. I do not say they are one in the sense



and the Hindu society, and particularly in this land there is another nation, that is, the Dravidian....

Safeguards must be provided for wherever there is a minority. I have always believed and I think I am right that no Government will ever succeed without instilling a sense of security and confidence in the minorities. No Government will succeed if their policy and programme would be unjust and unfair to the minorities. In no Government minorities should feel that they will have no fair play and justice. On that we shall not be wanting or lagging behind any civilised country in the world. And I am confident when the time comes the minorities in our homeland will find that with our traditions and our heritage, with our teachings of Islam, they will find that not only we shall be fair and just to them but generous.

The next thing I want to tell you is: What is the ideology of the League? I think that it had been made clear. But I think there are people in this world that require repetition and especially a section of the Hindu Press requires to be reminded over and over again so that they may not go on misrepresenting us. Now let me say that the ideology of the Muslim League is based on the fundamental principle that Muslims of India are an independent nationality and any attempt to get them to merge their national and political identity and unity will not only be resisted, but, in my opinion, it will be futile for any one to attempt it. We are determined, and let there be no mistake about it, to establish the status of an independent nation and an independent State in this sub-continent.

The next thing I want to tell you is, What is: our policy—internal, external and international? Our policy, the policy of the All-India Muslim League, is to endeavour to promote good-will and harmony among the peoples on the basis of equality, fair play and reciprocity. These can best be secured by agreements with other peoples, parties and States, with the objective of collective security and orderly development of the people living in different States as well as among other free States as members of a community pledged to respect each other's rights. Any action of domination by one over the other must be abandoned—the sooner this is abandoned the nearer will be the solution of India's problem.

The next question that is troubling us today is what is known as



had come to feel that they had acquired their self-respect, self-reliance and dignity and honour of their nation, they required thorough harnessing, consolidating and political training in a manner that would enable them to march along to their goal. I want that there should be lieutenants, majors, captains, colonels, and generals, and just as there are soldiers in the army we must have political soldiers. And these soldiers must be so well trained in political science that they could be prepared to face any emergency that might arise at any time.

...The goal of the All India Muslim League is...the establishment of completely independent States in the North-Western and Eastern Zones of India with full control of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Communication, Customs, Currency, Exchange, etc., and we do not want under any circumstances a constitution of an all-India character, with one government at the Centre. We will never agree to that. If you once agree, let me tell you, the Muslims will be absolutely wiped off their existence. We shall never be a signatory of any power of Government at the Centre so far as the North-Western and Eastern free national homes are concerned. The leadership of Hindu India, I regret to say, are being fooled and bamboozled by the policy and diplomacy of the...British Government, who are dangling in front of them united all-India constitution and democracy—two carrots before donkeys. The British Government know that Muslim India will never submit to an all-India constitution with one Central Government and the British statesmen know that so far as democracy, the parliamentary system of government, is concerned, it is nothing but a farce in this country.

It is not as some people mix it up, the question of Muslims objecting to the government which should be really based on the brotherhood of man as it is very often said by people who really do not understand what they are talking about when they talk about democracy or when they talk about Islam. Democracy means, to begin with, majority rule. Majority rule in a single society is understandable although even there it has failed. Representative government in a single nation, harmonious and homogeneous, in one society is understandable but you have got only to apply your mind a few minutes. Can such a system ever work or succeed when you have two different nations, indeed more than two different nations? In this sub-continent you have two different societies, the Muslim society



## APPENDIX I

### (Jinnah's Presidential Address at the Madras Session of the Muslim League, April 1941)

... I think you will remember that the first foundation of the revival of the All-India Muslim League was laid down in April 1936 at Bombay and it is now almost exactly five years. During the five years passed... we have, I think, it will be admitted on all hands, succeeded in organising Muslim India from one end of India to the other in a remarkable manner. Since the fall of the Mogul Empire, I think I am right in saying that Muslim India was never so well organised and so alive and so politically conscious as it is today.

We have established a flag of our own, a national flag of Muslim India. We have established a remarkable platform which displays and demonstrates a complete unity of the entire solid body of Muslim India. We have defined in the clearest language our goal about which Muslim India was groping in the dark and the goal is Pakistan....

No people can ever succeed in anything that they desire unless they work for it and work hard for it. What is required now is that you should think... and devise the programme of five-year plan and part of the five-year plan should be how quickly and how best the departments of national life of Muslim India be built up. What are those departments? These are the four main pillars. Let us devise a definite well-considered educational plan. It was knowledge, information and enlightenment that made a people great. Next, you know the Muslims are left behind economically and in the social life of the people of this great land of ours, the Muslims are at the bottom compared to other communities....

The next important thing was political training. While the Mussalmans had made remarkable progress in the sense that they had brought millions of Mussalmans under the banner of the Muslim flag, while they had become politically conscious, while they



autonomous Sikhistan could not be satisfied without a transfer of population—as the Sikhs were not in a majority in any compact area in the Punjab—which Jinnah had rejected.

Jinnah's acceptance of the Cabinet Mission Plan on June 6, 1946 has been pointed out as the evidence of the incomplete commitment of Jinnah to Pakistan; that at the last moment he was willing to settle for something less than a complete severance. When persuading the Muslim League Council to accept the Cabinet Mission Plan, Jinnah is said to have had misgivings but he did mention that that was the maximum he could get. Perhaps he hoped that a weak Centre and Muslim control of six provinces would on the one side give them a homeland and on the other ensure the unity of Assam, Bengal and the Punjab. But we have no more evidence, at least up to now, on the why and how of his acceptance.

Jinnah's contribution to Muslim nationalism may best be summarized in his own words. He said that the Muslim League, by uniting Muslims under its banner, ...has raised the Muslims of India to a dignity; it has raised the Muslims of India to have an honourable place in the affairs of this country. It has created amongst Muslims, rank and file, a spirit of discipline. It has given the Muslims the most wanted self-respect and self-reliance. It has given Muslim India a correct picture mirrored before you, a correct perspective of the grave issues which are affecting the Muslim nation today.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Jinnah's Presidential address delivered at the Special Pakistan Session of the Punjab Muslim Students' Federation, March 2, 1941, in Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, *ibid.*, p. 223.



Accordingly, the essentially secular Jinnah re-emerges in his very first speech to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on being elected its first President on August 11, 1947:

...in course of time all these angularities of majority and minority communities, the Hindu community and the Muslim community—because even as regards Muslims you have Pathans, Punjabis, Shias, Sunnis and so on, and among the Hindus you have Brahmins, Vashanavas, Khatris, also Bangalees, Madrasis, and so on—will vanish... You may belong to any religion or caste or creed—that has nothing to do with the business of the State.<sup>2</sup>

Pakistan he did not visualize as a theocratic State but one in which Muslims were in majority and therefore could preserve their cultural distinctiveness.

Regarding the Sikh problem in the Punjab, it may be said that Jinnah did not accept the partition of Bengal and the Punjab willingly, particularly since in the Punjab he had foreseen the heart of Pakistan. But there is no evidence that he ever got down seriously to placate the Sikh community or make any overtures to them. He did issue statements about the Sikhs telling them of their greater significance in a smaller Pakistan than they would have in a larger India.<sup>3</sup> He did no more, but perhaps he could do no more, for, on the one side, he was pre-occupied with much graver issues and, on the other, history of Muslim-Sikh antagonism left him little choice. It may also be that the Sikh demand for an

<sup>2</sup> Jinnah, *Speeches as Governor-General of Pakistan, 1947-48*, Pakistan Publications, Karachi, n.d. pp. 8-9.

<sup>3</sup> Jinnah's speech at the Annual Session of the All India Muslim Students' Federation, Jullundar, November 15, 1942, in Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, *op. cit.*, p. 449.



He never concealed the fact that Muslims in Muslim minority provinces would not form part of Pakistan.

I may explain that the Musalmans, wherever they are in a minority, cannot improve their position under a united India or under one Central government. Whatever happens, they would remain a minority...by coming in the way of the division of India they do not and cannot improve their own position. On the other hand, they can, by their attitude of obstruction, bring the Muslim homeland and 60,000,000 of the Musalmans under one government, where they would remain no more than a minority in perpetuity.<sup>1</sup>

His warning was repeated in several subsequent speeches.

It is obvious that in any society, whether secular or otherwise, the dominant way of life is always that of the dominant group. Therefore, whether by Congress choice or otherwise, it seemed that India would be a Hindu-dominated State. Consequently, the interests of Muslims could be safeguarded by securing them a State of their own in which they were dominant, so that the distinctive Indian Muslim culture would not for ever be lost in an India, theoretically secular but in reality Hindu-dominated. Thus Pakistan was to be the State of the Muslims with Muslims in majority and dominant and free to establish a society of their own choice. Once the preservation of the distinctive Muslim way of life and culture was ensured in a Muslim-dominated State, there remained no further need for insisting upon the separation of Muslims from non-Muslims.

<sup>1</sup> Presidential address of Jinnah at the All India Muslim League, Lahore Session, March 1940, in Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, *op. cit.*, pp. 165-66.



## JINNAH'S VIEW OF PAKISTAN

Jinnah's leadership has been subjected to criticism on three accounts; that Pakistan did not solve the minority problem because large numbers of Muslims remained in India and large numbers of non-Muslims were included in Pakistan; that Jinnah wanted the whole of the Punjab but did nothing to convince the Sikhs to make them throw in their lot with Pakistan; and that Pakistan was not really his objective but only the tactic to secure the largest number of concessions, and that in the end he could not control the Muslim masses and had to go along with them to a 'truncated, moth-eaten Pakistan'.

Pakistan, to Jinnah, symbolized the emancipation of the Muslim community from Hindu domination so that it could develop and practise its values and its distinctive way of life. He was fully conscious that partition would leave minorities in both States, but in one Muslims would be dominant and in the other Hindus. He was aware that a considerable number of Muslims would be left in India, but there was no other way out. Those who would be left in India could not be helped even if all Muslims were left in India. Pakistan would enable at least 70 per cent Indian Muslims to live as Muslims. However, partition would be achieved on the basis of the sacrifices of the Indian Muslims.



## THE SITUATIONAL FACTOR

previous Muslim demands and distilling the essence of all the previous Muslim movements and individual campaigns. The Second World War and the plight of the British, resulting in numerous offers of independence at the end of the War, had made it amply plain that the end of India's subjugation was around the corner. With the Lahore Resolution, and the Quaid-i-Azam leading, the Muslim was bound to negotiate the corner successfully.



Gandhi's inability to come to terms with the reality of Indian politics. Hindu-Muslim agreement was impossible because Gandhi and Nehru both were dreamers—Gandhi with his religiosity and inner lights, and Nehru, who persistently refused to recognize the religious and cultural angularities of various Indian peoples, with his ideals of socialism and the greatness of India built upon a pyramid of cement mixing the colourless, grey and indistinguishable Hindu-Muslim particles. Only Jinnah realized that any agreement to be meaningful must be based upon the full cognizance that Hindus and Muslims were two distinct entities which should equitably share in the legacy of the British. It was the rejection of what he considered to be equitable sharing which compelled Jinnah to ask for equality of treatment, for which he devised the formula of Muslims being a nation.

The obvious question to be asked at this stage is that if Jinnah was so great and so competent, why did he lack the unreserved support of the overwhelming majority of Muslims until so late in his career. The answer is to be found in the situational aspect. As long as Jinnah said that Muslims were a group whose interests must be safeguarded, his politics on the one side echoed the Congress demands, and on the other sounded negative, with the initiative always in the hands of the Congress. It was only the 1940 Lahore Resolution that gave the Muslims a positive and distinctive demand of their own, a goal which was purely Muslim and capable of realization. It electrified not only the intelligentsia but also the masses. From the moment of the Resolution Jinnah was the Quaid-i-Azam, as he had never before been. He was *the* leader and the Muslims followed him to the bitter end. The Lahore Resolution was thus the highest and the most accurate articulation climaxing all the



done before. The League became the political incarnation of Muslim India and Jinnah its articulator and the supreme oracle.

Personal factors did help Jinnah in that by 1937 he had the most famous Muslim name in Indian politics; he was westernized, honest, principled, rich, intelligent with an immaculate logic and incisive wit, and in addition to all these attributes which became a part of his fame, he had acquired the reputation for being courageous and dauntless, incorruptible and unpurchasable, a successful lawyer and a second-to-none politician.

Of all the Indian politicians, perhaps of all times, Jinnah had the sharpest eye—and also the sharpest, and when he chose, the most stinging, tongue. He knew that the gradual Indianisation of the Army and the Services, along with the decennial constitutional advances would inevitably lead to the complete independence of India from Britain. Power, in that case, would be transferred to the politically advanced elements in the society who should establish a formula for sharing it. He knew that India was not a homogeneous one-nation State, and that the peace of the country could be preserved only as long as mob passions were not aroused. All his life he remained an advocate of elite politics and came down to mass politics only when forced to do so. He strongly opposed the mixing of religion with politics—which Gandhi practised—for he knew, and it was obvious that the Hindu and Muslim religions had never blended and would not do so in future, particularly when it came to the sharing of supreme political power. He consistently worked for Hindu-Muslim *entente*, until 1937, on the basis of agreed, negotiated, legally oriented formulas. He was disgusted with Gandhi's mysticism and metaphysical politics and continuously frustrated with



to enroll Muslim masses in the Congress left him no alternative but to organize the Muslim League campaign of mass contact. That the Muslims were by now ready to be politicized and electorally activated is plain for anyone to see in the results of all by-elections and elections between 1937 and 1945.

After 1937 Jinnah directed his attention towards the Muslim multitude. He spoke, though in English, yet at a level that they could follow his message when translated. In addition, his personal charisma was such that Muslim throngs sat spell-bound even without understanding a word while he spoke in English. He told them of the glory of the Muslim power, their separate identity, their nationhood and the prospect of its realization in the not-too-distant future. He told them that they were great in the past and could become great again only if they united and followed him. He gave them a positive goal to work for, a party, a flag and a programme to support and fight for. He enabled them to feel that they were the equal of any human being and as a group inferior to none, particularly to the Hindu; that soon they could have a State of their own, as sovereign and independent as any other, and thus be the masters of their destiny. He neither shamed them like Sayyid Ahmed Khan nor criticized them like Iqbal. Instead, he exhorted them, encouraged them, guided them and protected their interests. He would budge neither to the British nor to the Hindu and tolerate no Muslim Quislings.

Jinnah's rise to glory is the story of the political awakening of Indian Muslims and their consolidation under the banner of the Muslim League which for ten years prior to independence symbolized Muslim nationalism as no other organization or individual had ever



turned out in 1906—that made the Congress an uncomfortable political habitat for Jinnah. He could not honestly associate himself or work with organisations—the Congress and the Home Rule League—which he considered moving on the path of unconstitutionality. In 1920 he warned the Congress and India that Gandhi's path would lead to untold misery, and when nobody listened to him he chose political oblivion to the emasculation of his principles. That he was accurate in his forecast, there is no denying.

Not being a man of vendetta and personal pettiness, Jinnah continued supporting the Congress as long as it was possible for him. Though he had been personally humiliated in 1920 and again in 1928, he still supported the nationslist demands until 1937 when it became clear beyond redemption that Congress nationalism was only Hindu nationalism beneath a thin veneer of secularism. It was only then that he decided to chart a separate path for Muslims.

It is generally, though erroneously, thought that initially Jinnah's politics had been Indian nationalist and only later became Muslim communalist. There does not seem to be enough evidence to prove that Jinnah ever visualized India as a melting pot in which various communities with differing creeds became a grey mush. He had always looked upon India as a composite State and desired and worked for a harmonious and mutually satisfactory life for the Muslim community as well as all the various other communities. The transformation in his political techniques came when he became convinced of the futility of these aspirations.

Being opposed to rabble-rousing and the politics of mob hysteria, Jinnah refrained from taking politics to the level of the masses, but the 1937 Congress decision



## THE POLITICS OF JINNAH AND THE SITUATIONAL FACTOR

In his politics Jinnah was a liberal and a constitutionalist. He perceived politics as a game played in accordance with the rules and by those who know and understand the rules. He therefore visualized the political development of India towards the ultimate goal of independence through gradual stages and progressive steps with most decisions arrived at through negotiations and compromise between accredited leaders of various political elements in India.

Jinnah had been a prominent member of the Congress since his entry in that organization in 1906 and succeeded in creating an atmosphere of communal harmony in co-operation with Gokhale and even Tilak. He had brought large numbers of Muslims into Congress<sup>1</sup> and had looked forward to co-operation between Hindus and Muslims. It was the entry of Gandhi in Indian politics and his introduction of mysticism, religiosity, social and religious reform and religious appeals to Hindu masses, and, most of all, of the unconstitutional or extra-constitutional, non-violent non-co-operation as well as the conversion of Congress into a mass organisation—which now readmitted the extremists

<sup>1</sup> Nehru, *op. cit.*, p. 67.



nationalist Muslim. His political career spanned almost one half century and thus he was in the thick of Indian politics before many in India had heard of Gandhi or of his non-violent non-co-operation, or before Nehru had learned the meaning of politics. He was already a famous and front-rank Indian politician—'a giant of politics,' as Edwin Montagu called him on his 1917 trip to India.<sup>5</sup> As early as 1910, when he was first elected to the Imperial Legislative Council, Jinnah had become known as a dauntless nationalist who would not be intimidated even by a Viceroy of India and was ready to cross swords with him.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Edwin S. Montagu, *An Indian Diary* (Venetia Montagu, ed.), Heinemann, London, 1930, pp. 56-58.

<sup>6</sup> Bolitho, *op. cit.*, pp. 47-48.



application to actual life consists of seven lectures,<sup>2</sup> written in English, and contains a message that is beyond the intellectual grasp of most mortals. Iqbal, though he first started as an Indian nationalist, later completely changed and became an Islamist. He gave his allegiance to and glorified Islam—not Indian Islam or the Muslim world or any Muslim people, but Islam itself. He became completely opposed to nationalism of any kind, for he assigned to it the blame for all the sufferings of mankind and found nationalism irreconcilable with Islam.<sup>3</sup> The only evidence of Iqbal the Muslim nationalist are his 1930 presidential address and his *Letters to Jinnah* written during the dusk of his life. Thus while Iqbal could arouse the religious fervour of educated Muslims to the height of ecstasy, he failed to communicate with the Indian Muslim masses and to instill in them a sense of political purpose. He criticized them for their inertia, backwardness and superstition, and though, like Sayyid Ahmed Khan, he talked of Muslims as a separate nation, he did little for them to achieve their goal.

Unlike Sayyid Ahmed Khan and Iqbal, Jinnah was concerned neither with religion or philosophy nor with mysticism or poetry. He was neither a social reformer nor an educationist; he was neither a pan-Islamist nor was Islam his *patria*. Jinnah was essentially a politician—“a pure politician”<sup>4</sup>—and an ardent nationalist, but he was primarily a Muslim nationalist and never a

<sup>2</sup> M. Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, Ashraf, Lahore, reprinted 1962, first published 1930.

<sup>3</sup> Qureshi, *op. cit.*, pp. 263-64.

<sup>4</sup> Prof. Humayun Kabir, a Congress Muslim politician of long standing and a former Minister in the Government of India, in an interview to the author, in London, 1967.



During the century preceding partition Muslim India produced three top positivist leaders concerned with the problem of Indian Muslims as Muslims, and who offered Indian solutions. Sayyid Ahmed Khan was the first such leader. He exhorted the Muslims to wake up from their slumber; criticised them for their backwardness; he shamed them on their obscurantism; he instilled loyalty to the British into their thinking. The Muslims were awakened by his efforts but they were not humoured. It is not flattering for a people to be shamed on their backwardness and to be asked to give their loyalty to a foreign master, particularly when that master has been responsible for their ruination. Muslims had not given up their pride or their past which they considered glorious, a past which was prevented from coming into present and future by the same foreigner whom they were now asked to give allegiance. He, therefore, could never arouse Indian Muslims to the height of their potential. In addition he offered no positive goal beyond improving their educational position under the aegis of the British. He was thus essentially a Muslim social reformer and an educationist.

Iqbal was primarily a thinker, a poet and an idealist. He was more concerned with philosophy and mysticism than with politics and social uplift. Furthermore, his poetry may thrill millions of hearts and his poems may be on the lips of countless Indian Muslims but his intellectual message reached only a few. Iqbal himself did not seem to have cared much for communicating with the masses: of his eight volumes of poetry, five were written in Persian and only three in highly Persianized Urdu. His only work concerning the meaning of Islam and its



## SIR SAYYID, DR. IQBAL AND MR. JINNAH

There can be no denying that Indian Muslims had travelled a long way. Sir Sayyid Ahmed Khan made them conscious of their separate existence, the Aga Khan secured them separate electorates, Iqbal gave them an ideology and imbibed them with a sense of separate destiny, Rehmat Ali coined the name of their separate State and Jinnah bound them together as never before "to effect an act of political creation"<sup>1</sup> and gave them a separate State.

Between Sayyid Ahmed Khan and Jinnah intervened a number of Muslim leaders—Tayabji, Vaqar-ul-Mulk, the Aga Khan, Mohamed Ali, Shaukat Ali, Hakim Ajmal Khan, Dr. Ansari, Maulana Azad, and Iqbal—but some of them are hardly remembered and none made as indelible a mark upon Indian history and upon the destiny of Indian Musalmans as Jinnah did. None acquired the hold on Muslim masses, none galvanized them into a force, none made them conscious of their nationality and their potential as Jinnah did. Jinnah, who, it was generally believed, projected neither a religious personality nor religious politics, and was always aloof, became the leader of the Muslims as none had ever become before.

<sup>1</sup> Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 806-7.



Jinnah announced a 'Direct Action' day on August 16, 1946, a day of mourning by the Muslims. The 'Direct Action' Day started a wave of violence that spread over the whole width of Northern India. Wavell and after him Mountbatten tried their best to resuscitate the Cabinet Mission Plan, but Jinnah had no confidence in the word or the sincerity of the Congress. The orgy of communal violence that followed, the clash of Hindu and Muslim nationalisms, for all time ruled out any possibility of conciliation or compromise.

By 1947 nothing could break the Congress-League deadlock. Victory seemed at hand to Jinnah who refused to yield even an inch in the demand for Pakistan. Jinnah, who had known the Congress longer than any of its own members,

so cast Congress tactics back upon itself that it was that body itself which now began to see in partition the only alternative to prolonged civil war and fearful destruction of human life. In May they themselves proposed the partition of the Punjab as the only alternative to civil war.<sup>9</sup>

And so the League steered the Muslim nation to its self-chosen destiny. On the fateful June 3, 1947 it was announced to the world that India would be partitioned into two sovereign States—India and Pakistan—on August 15, 1947. It was with a sigh of relief that the world heard of this announcement, but in India itself communal riots continued on an unprecedented scale. The persistent refutation of Muslim nationalism by the dominant Hindu nationalism had made the parting of the ways inevitable.

<sup>9</sup> Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 831.



Another effort was made in 1946 to revive the Cripps proposals in a somewhat modified form by a mission led by Lord Pethick-Lawrence, the new Secretary of State for India. The Cabinet Mission Plan, as the new scheme came to be known, provided for a federation with powers over only foreign affairs, defence, and communications, thus reducing the powers of the Centre, and for the provinces to form subordinate unions of their own—thus conceding the principle of Pakistan while maintaining the unity of India. Jinnah persuaded the Muslim League on June 6, 1946 to accept the plan though the Mission had definitely rejected a sovereign Pakistan. He had many misgivings about the plan but his acceptance was genuine. Muslims would get undivided all the six provinces that they had asked for. In the short term, Muslim interests were fairly safeguarded and in the long term, there was still hope of separation with all six provinces intact.<sup>6</sup> After a long suspense the Congress gave a qualified consent on June 25, 1946. At a press conference on July 10, 1946 Nehru explained the meaning of the qualified consent by saying that Congress would apply its own interpretation to the plan and would enter the Constituent Assembly “completely unfettered by agreements and free to meet all situations as they arise.” In addition, there would be no grouping of provinces.<sup>7</sup> This was the last straw on the camel’s back and Jinnah retaliated sharply. He rejected the plan, withdrew the League acceptance, and declared: This day we bid goodbye to constitutional methods.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>6</sup> Moon, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

<sup>7</sup> *Indian Annual Register*, July-December 1946, Vol. II, pp. 5 and 145-147.

<sup>8</sup> Moon, *op. cit.*, p. 57.



but now the League was not willing to accept it in the hope of achieving partition. The Simla Conference floundered on the issue of who the Muslim representatives were to be and who was to choose them, now that the Congress had agreed to Hindu-Muslim parity. The list submitted by the Congress included representatives of all major parties, Jinnah and two others for the League and two Congress Muslims—Azad and Asaf Ali—on the ground that the Congress was a nationalist organization. The League resisted the pre-emption of the Muslim quota even in a limited way. The Congress was trying to recreate the 1937 principle of its being a supra-communal organisation. Jinnah stood firm and declined to submit his list unless he was assured that all the Muslims on the Executive Council would be League nominees. And thus the Simla Conference broke down because Jinnah would not compromise.<sup>4</sup> Jinnah's argument was that the League had the support of an overwhelming majority of Indian Muslims—evidence: the League victories in by-elections and the seats it held in all Assemblies. He demanded Pakistan at the end of the war, and agreed to the League's participation in the Conference only if it was given half of the seats since it represented the Muslim nation. The Conference had actually rejected both of these demands by giving the League only one-third of the seats and by giving undue weight to the nationalist Muslims who represented only an infinitesimal minority of Muslims. Since the decisions were to be taken by a majority of votes, the unity of India would thus have been assured and that would have amounted to Jinnah signing the 'death warrant' of the Muslims.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>4</sup> *The London Times*, July 16, 1945.

<sup>5</sup> Moon, *op. cit.*, p. 41 and Coupland, *op. cit.*, p. 255.



the Governments and legislatures of Assam, Bengal, the N.W.F.P. and Sindh. Only in the Punjab the Unionists remained intransigent. The increasing strength of the League was thus plain for all to see, but Gandhi still insisted that Britain either transfer power to the Congress or "leave India in God's hands, or in modern parlance to anarchy. Then all parties will fight one another like dogs or will, when real responsibility faces them, come to a reasonable agreement...."<sup>2</sup>

Soon thereafter, in 1942, the Congress demanded of the British to 'Quit India'. The League was determined not to be left in a position of helplessness and at the mercy of the more numerous Congress. Jinnah, therefore, said to the British that they must 'Divide and (then) Quit'.

In July 1944 Rajagopalachari's offer to resolve the Congress-League tangle, which had been rejected by the Congress followed by Rajagopalachari's expulsion<sup>3</sup> was renewed by Gandhi. Gandhi and Jinnah met in September, 1944 to discuss the proposal but Jinnah rejected it. However, Jinnah-Gandhi talks represented an admission on the part of Gandhi that the Congress alone did not represent all India and that the Muslim League spoke for the Musalmans.

The Cripps offer was renewed by the Viceroy, Lord Wavell, in an invitation for a conference to meet on June 25, 1945 in Simla. There was a preponderance of Congress and League representatives and Congress, which had rejected the same offer three years ago, was now willing to accept it in the hope of avoiding partition,

<sup>2</sup> *Harijan*, April 26, 1942.

<sup>3</sup> Anticipating his expulsion, Rajagopalachari himself resigned his membership in the Congress before he could be expelled.



The Congress, however, was agreeable to no solution other than immediate independence, negotiated with the Congress alone. It was this blind insistence of the Congress in defiance of the election results (mentioned on pp. 49-51) that forced the League to draft the Pakistan Resolution.

Sir Stafford Cripps arrived in India on March 22, 1942 with an offer which added to the 1940 offer the right of complete independence to India as well as the right of opting out of the Indian Union to any province or provinces. In immediate terms, Indians were invited to enter the enlarged Executive Council. The offer was rejected by the Congress on the usual grounds and by the League for making Pakistan only optional, though it had conceded to the Congress almost all it wanted with only a concession to the League—highly distasteful to the Congress. The Congress had not realized the strength of the League and was sure that if given power at the Centre it would stifle the League. "The stake of a united India under Hindu control was one worth playing for",<sup>1</sup> which a little waiting would make possible.

The hold of the League on the Muslim masses had so increased that when the Viceroy enlarged his Executive Council in the summer of 1941 without accepting Jinnah's formula for Hindu-Muslim parity, Jinnah ordered the League members not to serve on it. The Premiers of the Punjab, Bengal and Assam, who had accepted appointments on the Defence Council, were ordered to resign and they did resign. The new Muslim Law Member was expelled from the League when he refused to resign as ordered. The Muslim League, in 1942, obviously occupied a position of dominance in

<sup>1</sup> Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 827.



## INDEPENDENCE PLANS AND THE ACHIEVEMENT OF MUSLIM NATIONHOOD

At the start of the war the League had expressed its willingness to support the British war effort, but on condition of justice for Muslims in provinces where they were a minority, and of a guarantee that no constitutional advance would be made without their consent. The Congress, on its part, had demanded that Britain explain her war aims, wholly Indianise the Viceroy's Executive Council, and make an immediate declaration of Indian independence. The Congress also demanded that it should be recognized as the only representative of India—the Gandhi-Irwin Pact had given the Congress to believe that it was political India incarnate. This demand was to recur again and again throughout the period of negotiations during the war years and prove to be the main source of friction between the League and the Congress. Neither the Government nor the League was prepared to go along with this demand. Thus the deadlock continued because what Britain was willing to concede the Congress was not willing to accept.

On August 8, 1940 Britain offered Dominion Status to India after the war on the basis of an Indian-made constitution but insisting upon minority rights as well as minority consent to the proposed constitution.



'Independent States' in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign.<sup>18</sup>

Muslim nationality had finally asserted itself and, to use Lord Acton's words:

Thenceforward there was a nation demanding to be united in a State—a soul, as it were, wandering in search of a body in which to begin life again; and, for the first time, a cry was heard that the arrangement of States was unjust—that their limits were unnatural, and that a whole people was deprived of its right to constitute an independent community.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>18</sup> *The All India Muslim League, Resolutions, December 1938-March 1940*, in Gwyer & Appadorai, *op. cit.*, p. 443.

<sup>19</sup> Lord Acton, "Nationality", *Essays on Freedom and Power*, The Free Press, Glencoe, Ill., 1949, p. 171. This essay first appeared in *The Home and Foreign Review*, 1 July, 1862, pp. 164-74.



put the last nail in the coffin of Hindu-Muslim unity during 1937-1939.

The indication of how far the Muslim position had now hardened came in the form of an article Jinnah wrote for an English journal.<sup>15</sup> After recounting the constitutional maladies from which India suffered, pointing out Congress high-handedness and the dismal record of British Governors in dealing with the minority problem, Jinnah announced that western democracy was totally unsuited to India and "a constitution must be evolved that recognizes that there are in India two nations, who both must share the governance of their common motherland."<sup>16</sup> As Professor Coupland remarks, Jinnah was still talking of sharing, not of separation,<sup>17</sup> but the League session on March 22-24, 1940, held in Lahore and attended by as many as 100,000 members, made the pronouncement that led to the final crossing of the Rubicon. Resolution No. 1, introduced by Maulvi A. K. Fazlul Huq, the Premier of Bengal and seconded by Chaudhri Khaliquzzaman, leader of the Muslim League Party in the U. P. Assembly, on March 23, laid down that no constitutional plan would be acceptable to Muslims unless the

...geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority as in the North-Western and Eastern zones of India should be grouped to constitute

<sup>15</sup> *Time and Tide*, January 19, 1940. See Appendix II for the text of this article.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>17</sup> Coupland, *op. cit.*, p. 191.



grouping of all Indian provinces and States into seven regions, two of which covered Muslim majority areas. The whole of India was to be a federation with a weak Centre.<sup>12</sup>

Dr. Syed Abdul Latif came out with a scheme, also in 1939, proposing numerous blocks, four of which would be Muslim: the North-West block, the North-East block, the Delhi-Lucknow block and the Deccan block, all based upon Muslim cultural homogeneity. Latif also suggested an exchange of population. His scheme would have created a confederation or a League of Indian nations.<sup>13</sup>

Professor Zafrul Hasan and Dr. Afzal Husain Qadri of Aligarh University came very close in their scheme to what actually turned out to be Pakistan. They suggested the division of India into three zones, two of them Muslim Zones constituting the Pakistan Federation.<sup>14</sup>

Thus between 1920 and 1939 a number of proposals pointing to Muslims as a separate and distinct nationality needing a separate homeland were advanced, but neither did the League officially adopt any of them nor did they catch the imagination of the Muslim masses, for there seemed still to be some hope of a Hindu-Muslim settlement. The Congress Ministries, it seems,

<sup>12</sup> Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan, *Outline of a Scheme of Indian Federation*, Mufid-i-Aam Press, Lahore, n.d., reproduced in Gwyer & Appadorai, *op. cit.*, pp. 455-462, also see *Punjab Legislative Assembly Debates*, Vol. XVI, No. I, pp. 359-62.

<sup>13</sup> Dr. Syed Abdul Latif, *The Muslim Problem of India*, The Times of India Press, Bombay, 1939, in Gwyer & Appadorai, *op. cit.*, pp. 444-455.

<sup>14</sup> Syed Zafrul Hasan and Mohammad Afzal Husain Qadri, *The Problem of Indian Muslims and its Solution*, Aligarh University Press, 1939, in Gwyer & Appadorai, *op. cit.*, pp. 462-65.



scheme” and Zafrullah Khan adding that they had “considered it chimerical and impracticable”.<sup>8</sup>

In addition to Lajpat Rai, or in continuation with him, the argument of separate nationality for Hindus and Muslims was reasserted, this time by V. D. Savarkar, in his presidential address to the Hindu Mahasabha in 1937:

India cannot be assured today to be a unitarian and homogeneous nation, but on the contrary there are two nations in the main, the Hindus and Muslims in India.<sup>9</sup>

Even six years later, while denying the right of Muslims to a separate homeland, Savarkar reaffirmed that he had no quarrel with Mr. Jinnah’s two-nation theory. We, Hindus are a nation by ourselves and it is a historical fact that Hindus and Muslims are two nations.<sup>10</sup>

On October 10, 1938, for the second time, a Muslim League platform was used to advance partition as the political solution of India when Sir Abdulla Haroon moved “a resolution urging that India be divided into two Federations, one for Muslims and the other for non-Muslim groups,” at the Sindh Muslim League Conference in Karachi under the presidency of Mohammad Ali Jinnah.<sup>11</sup>

In 1939 Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan, the Unionist Premier of the Punjab, issued a pamphlet suggesting the

<sup>8</sup> *Minutes of Evidence given before the Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform (Session 1932-33)*, Vol. III, p. 1496, in Pirzada, *op. cit.*, pp. 135-136.

<sup>9</sup> In K. R. Bombwall, *Indian Politics and Government*, Atmaram & Sons, Delhi, 1951, p. 285.

<sup>10</sup> Savarkar replying to a question at a press conference at Nagpur. *Indian Annual Register*, July-December 1943, Vol. II, p. 10.

<sup>11</sup> *Indian Annual Register*, July-December 1938, Vol. II, p. 17.



in declaring that, if the principle that the Indian Muslim is entitled to full and free development on the lines of his own culture and tradition in his own Indian homelands is recognized as the basis of a permanent communal settlement, he will be ready to stake his all for the freedom of India....India is a continent of human groupings belonging to different races, speaking different languages and professing different religions....It is clear that in view of India's infinite variety... the creation of autonomous States...is the only possible way to secure a stable constitutional structure in India....The Muslim demand for the creation of a Muslim India within India is, therefore, perfectly justified.<sup>5</sup>

Iqbal had already communicated his proposal to the Nehru Committee in 1928, but they had rejected it on the ground that it would create an unwieldy State.<sup>6</sup> Iqbal did not give up his scheme, though it lay dormant for a few years. He wrote several letters to Jinnah during 1936 and 1937 reminding Jinnah that his was the only scheme capable of solving the communal problem and that the time had come for the renewal of the Muslim demand.<sup>7</sup>

Earlier in 1933 Rehmat Ali, an Indian Muslim student at Cambridge, had published a pamphlet advancing his scheme for separate Muslim States in India called Pakistan, but it was brushed aside by Muslim leaders: Abdullah Yusuf Ali calling it "only a student's

<sup>5</sup> Presidential address of Dr. Sir Muhammad Iqbal delivered at the Allahabad Session of the All India Muslim League, December 1930. Reproduced in Gwyer and Appadorai, *op. cit.*, pp. 435-37.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 437.

<sup>7</sup> *Letters of Iqbal to Jinnah*, Ashraf, Lahore, 1942, reprinted 1963.



and applying the principle of international society, the Muslim nation demanded equality with the Hindu nation. Indian Muslims, like other nations, possessed their homeland; it only needed to be consolidated in a coherent State.

The idea of territorial consolidation was not new.<sup>1</sup> Already in April 1920 Abdul Qadir Bilgrami had published an open letter to Gandhi in *Zul Qarnain* advocating the division of India in Hindu and Muslim zones, and even giving a list of districts which was not fundamentally different from the present day Pakistan.<sup>2</sup> In 1923 Sardar Muhammad Gul Khan advocated the partition of India before the Frontier Inquiry Committee.<sup>3</sup> Lala Lajpat Rai, one of the founders of the Hindu Mahasabha wrote a series of newspaper articles "From Ravi to Brahmaputra" suggesting the partition of India between Hindus and Muslims in 1924.<sup>4</sup> Officially the proposal was for the first time propounded from the platform of the Muslim League when Dr. Iqbal advanced the philosophical basis of the scheme in his well-formulated presidential address in 1930:

The unity of an Indian nation, therefore, must be sought, not in the negation, but in the mutual harmony and co-operation of the many.... The only practical course is not to assume the existence of a state of things which does not exist, but to recognize facts as they are.... And as far as I have been able to read the Muslim mind, I have no hesitation

<sup>1</sup> For a complete list of partition plans see S. Sharifuddin Pirzada, *Evolution of Pakistan*, The All Pakistan Legal Decisions, Lahore, 1963, part III.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 90.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 95-96.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 97-99.



## THE MUSLIM NATION SEEKS A SEPARATE HOMELAND

By 1938-39 Jinnah had become convinced that mere safeguards in a unitary India were not enough to protect the interests of the Muslims. Congress Governments in the provinces had given ample proof that any reliance on the special powers of the Governors and 'safeguards' would be misplaced. Before the implementation of the Act of 1935 Jinnah was highly critical of it on account of its inability to give real power to Indians. Now he realized that with whatever limited powers they had in the provinces the Congress Governments could be so arbitrary; if, therefore, they got full powers at the Centre too, then the rights of Muslim India would be totally at their mercy. His position regarding the Act of 1935 completely changed and he rejected it wholly—the provincial part as well as the Central one.

Until now the politics of the League had been negative—Muslims were considered a minority—and safeguards were asked for them. Being a minority of about 25 per cent, they could never expect to become a majority or even equal to the Hindus. Safeguards would always keep them at the mercy of the Hindus, and already they had proved ineffective. Consequently, it was now claimed that Muslims were not a community within an Indian nation, but a nation within a multi-national India,



the 22nd of December, as the day of deliverance and thanks-giving as a mark of relief that the Congress Governments have at last ceased to function. I hope that the provincial, district and primary Leagues all over India will hold public meetings and pass resolutions and offer prayers by way of thanks-giving for being delivered from the unjust Congress rule.<sup>29</sup>

The 'Day of Deliverance' was celebrated throughout India not only by Muslims but by other communities as well.<sup>30</sup> The Hindu-Muslim rift had become almost unbridgeable but the League was still undecided about future plans. In March 1939 the Working Committee of the Muslim League declared its irrevocable opposition to any federal system and appointed a sub-committee, under Jinnah's direction, to look into various schemes of a constitutional nature.

<sup>29</sup> *Indian Annual Register*, July-December 1939, Vol. II, p. 46.

<sup>30</sup> Bolitho, *op. cit.*, p. 124.



the forcible Hinduization of Muslims. These cultural fears were augmented by the political activities of the Congressites that included the establishment of parallel subordinate Congress organisations that issued orders, Congress police stations that started investigating crimes, and the military departments that started raising a provincial force of half a million. To Muslims, Congress Ministries did not look like provincial governments by the Congress party but like the takeover of power by Hindus which immediately excluded them from a share in it. They also felt that this power was used against their interests.

While the atrocities of the Congress Governments may have frightened the rank and file of Muslims, their educated sections were repulsed by the Congress claim to be supra-communal. In their eyes the Congress Governments had already established a Hindu Raj threatening their religious rights and practices. And if things developed this way, Hindu 'banyas' would dominate their economic life and, the Congress being a Hindu body, they would have no escape. The truth or the untruth of the Muslim complaints is beside the point.

The historical importance of the period of the Congress Ministries lies not so much in the question of whether the Muslim grievances were great or whether they were exaggerated, but in the fact that the overwhelming majority of Muslims believed them to exist.<sup>28</sup>

On the resignation of the Congress Ministries in October and November 1939, Jinnah declared on December 6th:

I wish Musalmans all over India to observe, Friday,

<sup>28</sup> Symonds, *op. cit.*, p. 60.



By the end of 1939 it was widely believed that, if Congress Governments had lasted much longer, communal fighting would have broken out on an unprecedented scale. The idea of a 'civil war' had been an almost inconceivable idea as long as British rule was unquestioned, but now many Indians were saying it was coming.<sup>25</sup>

Communal riots affected both the maintenance of law and order and communal harmony. Communal harmony was greatly weakened because the Muslims came to see a sinister Hindu design to culturally strangle them. They compiled a long list of grievances<sup>26</sup> which demonstrate their feelings that they were being culturally and politically dominated. They resented the singing of *Bande Mataram*, the flying of the Congress flag from public buildings, public schools being called *vidya mandir*, and worst, they were horrified at their children having to do *puja*<sup>27</sup> before Gandhi's portrait, salute it and in general show religious reverence to it. They felt abhorred at the replacement of Urdu—the language created and developed by Muslims in India—by Hindi. They were disgusted with the school text books which glorified Hinduism at the expense of Islam. To them all this looked like the first step towards

<sup>25</sup> Coupland, *op. cit.*, p. 187.

<sup>26</sup> The grievances are given in: *The New Times*, Lahore, November 1, 1938, *The Report of the Inquiry Committee appointed by the Council of the All India Muslim League to inquire into Muslim Grievances in Congress Provinces*, November 15, 1938, reproduced in Gwyer & Appadorai, *Speeches and Documents on the Indian Constitution*, Oxford, 1957, pp. 407-416, in Coupland, *op. cit.*, pp. 174-86, which also mentions, on p. 185, *Muslim Sufferings under Congress Rule*, 1939, Qureshi, *op. cit.*, p. 294, Aziz, *op. cit.*, pp. 138-39.

<sup>27</sup> *Mandir* literally means temple; *puja* literally means worship.



place from 1937 onwards: of the 61 by-elections to Muslim seats between 1937 and 1943, the League won 47, independent Muslims 10 and Congress Muslims only 4; of the 14 Central Legislature by-elections the League won 7 and the Congress only 2.<sup>21</sup> And from 1943 to 1945, of the 11 Muslim seats in the provinces the League won 8, independent Muslims 3 and Congress none; of the Centre all 4 were won by the League. In the most crucial elections of 1945 the Muslim League won all Muslims seats in the Central Assembly and 446 out of 495 in the provincial Assemblies.<sup>22</sup> Thus the Congress claim that there were only two parties in India—the British and the Congress—and that the Congress represented all India had come to sound not only hollow but also hypocritical.

The two most crucial tests for the success of Congress Ministries were the maintenance of law and order and communal harmony. Between 1937 and 1939, 85 serious riots with 2000 casualties and 170 fatalities took place in British India.<sup>23</sup> Riots were nothing new in India, but by this time they had become more pre-meditated and persistent than at any time in the past. Lt.-Col. Muirhead, the Under-Secretary of State for India, after an unofficial tour of India in 1939 found a sharp increase in Hindu-Muslim antagonism which had exceeded mere religious feelings and become a clash between two different ways of life.<sup>24</sup> Indian observers and British officials were in agreement that Hindu-Muslim relations had never before been so bad.

<sup>21</sup> Coupland, *op. cit.*, p. 184.

<sup>22</sup> R. Symonds, *The Making of Pakistan*, Faber & Faber, London, n.d., p. 67.

<sup>23</sup> Coupland, *op. cit.*, p. 187.

<sup>24</sup> *The London Times*, February 17, 1939.



became the leader of Indian Muslims, so acknowledged even by the Premiers of the Punjab and Bengal. He was hailed by Muslim crowds as the embodiment of Muslim pride and pugnacity.<sup>17</sup>

Rejecting the League co-operation on one side, the Congress, on the other, had embarked upon a movement of mass Muslim contact in order to bring them within the Congress fold on the basis of a socialist programme<sup>18</sup> and thus to wipe the League out of existence. This was a challenge to a party so far confined to middle and upper class membership. Taking the challenge seriously, the League also embarked upon a "policy and programme of mass contact,"<sup>19</sup> even before the Congress could make much headway. The appeal to Muslim masses inevitably sharpened the focus on the theme of Hindu domination, something akin to what the Congress had done in its own nationalistic appeal against British imperialism. Unfortunately for them, the Congress leaders had not realized that an undertaking of mass Muslim contact on their part could be turned against them. The appeal of the League on the theme of Hindu domination obviously had more attraction for the Muslim masses than the Congress programme of socialism.<sup>20</sup>

As a result, a general swing in Muslim support for the League took place, which could be observed in the outcome of the by-elections and elections that took

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, and Coupland, *op. cit.*, pp. 183-184.

<sup>18</sup> Jawaharlal Nehru's presidential address and the Lucknow Congress resolution on the mass contact, April, 1936. *Report of the Forty-ninth Session of the Indian National Congress (April 1936)*, pp. 31-32 & 92.

<sup>19</sup> In Ahmad, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

<sup>20</sup> Moon, *op. cit.*, p. 18.



be formed. A couple of Muslims might be appointed Ministers provided, they were told: You "abjure your party and forswear your policy and programme and liquidate the Muslim League."<sup>13</sup> The terms, issued by Maulana Azad, on which the Muslims might join the U.P. Government,<sup>14</sup> were considered highly insulting and provocative.

The Muslim League leaders chose political wilderness to the loaves and fishes of office and refused to be a party to the extinction of the League. The Congress rejection of coalitions came as a personal rebuff to Jinnah, after his life-long advocacy of Hindu-Muslim co-operation as embodied in the pre-election League manifesto. Instead of buckling in, Jinnah declared "that the Musalmans cannot expect any justice or fairplay" at the hands of the Congress because "the present leadership of the Congress . . . has been responsible for alienating the Musalmans of India more and more by pursuing a policy which is exclusively Hindu. . . ."<sup>15</sup> It was preposterous of the Congress to claim that it represented the Muslims, for it soon became evident that Jinnah did not stand alone. The Premiers of the Punjab, Bengal and Assam now advised their Muslim supporters to join the League.<sup>16</sup> The strength and the prestige of the League had an unprecedented meteoric rise and Jinnah himself acquired an eminence he never had before. Until now Jinnah had been recognized as one of the leaders, a leader of a section. Now suddenly he

<sup>13</sup> Jinnah's presidential address at the Lucknow Session of the League, October 1937, in Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

<sup>14</sup> *The Pioneer*, Lucknow, July 30, 1937, reproduced in Coupland, *op. cit.*, p. 294.

<sup>15</sup> In Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

<sup>16</sup> Moor, *op. cit.*, pp. 14-17.



that in Congress majority provinces the idea of coalition could not be entertained. . . . In particular this doctrine applied to Muslims. *Muslim nationalists represented Muslims as Muslims in Congress and Congress as a whole represented Muslims as Indians.* Accordingly no separate Muslim representation was necessary and no coalition with the Muslim League could be entertained.<sup>10</sup>

The Congress further argued that if the League leaders supported the Congress programme they should join the Congress and work from within it. Thus the Congress decided to seek the elimination of the League opposition, not by co-operating with it but by absorbing it. Why, the Congress asked

should. . . . an overwhelming majority in the Legislatures hamper itself by an alliance with so small, so weak, and, in its opinion, so reactionary a body as the League, merely because it was Moslem?<sup>11</sup>

Moreover, it was in the Muslim minority provinces where the League was strongest. Its elimination there would lead to its elimination in the rest of India and "once the League, which, whatever its weakness, was the only party capable of organizing a common Moslem opposition throughout India, was out of the way",<sup>12</sup> the Congress would have unchallenged and unobstructed sway all over the country.

Acting on this principle developed in the U.P., which also applied to the rest of the Congress provinces, the Congress told the League that no coalitions would

<sup>10</sup> V. A. Smith, *The Oxford History of India*, 3rd ed., (P. Spear, ed.), Oxford, 1958, pp. 817-18, italics mine.

<sup>11</sup> Coupland, *op. cit.*, p. 181.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*



majority provinces various Muslim groups and independents won.

After winning the elections the Congress refused to accept office unless the 'safeguards' clauses in the Act were repealed and the Governors gave the undertaking not to interfere in administration. The repeal would have required an amendment of the Act and there was the danger of opposition from the minorities. This the Government was unable to do, but, in order to conciliate, the Viceroy issued a declaration assuring that Governors would not interfere in the administration and their special powers would not be used unnecessarily.<sup>9</sup> On this assurance Congress formed Ministries in seven provinces in July 1937.

Dealing with the Muslims in the formation of Ministries in Hindu majority provinces, the Congress had two choices: (1) to co-operate with the League, (2) to disregard and override it. Jinnah had suggested the first even before the elections were held and it would have provided for compromise and conciliation, but the Congress chose the second. Coalition would not provide for "Congress Raj" upon which many Congressmen had set their hearts. The campaign for social uplift and for combating British imperialism would be better conducted if carried on under one direction. In addition, these factors did not involve communal aspects of politics and Cabinet solidarity could be better achieved if Ministries were homogeneous.

...Congress boldly claimed to be the *de facto* representative of the Indian people. Other groups might represent different viewpoints, but only Congress represented India as a whole. From this it followed

<sup>9</sup> *The London Times*, June 22, 1937.



out of 175 in the Punjab and 7 out of 60 in Sindh. Most of even these seats were for Hindu constituencies. Of the 482 Muslim seats in British India the Congress contested only 58 seats and won only 26—slightly more than five per cent of the Muslim seats.<sup>7</sup>

Muslims, on their side, were divided among themselves. Of their 482 seats the Muslim League won 113, independent Muslims 173—the Unionists in the Punjab getting 96 out of 175 seats—62 were won by other Muslims and 8 by the Muslim United Party of Bihar.<sup>8</sup>

The Muslim victories came in Muslim majority provinces but they were not League victories. The League was strongest in Muslim minority provinces, particularly the United Provinces. It had little power over the majority of Muslim members in Muslim majority provinces. In Bengal and Sindh Muslim factions were at war with each other. In the overwhelmingly Muslim N.W.F.P., Muslims, having no fear of Hindus, joined hands with the Congress. In the Punjab the Unionists—a Muslim-Hindu-Sikh Coalition—were predominant. Most of their members were Muslims and a large number of them were also members of the League. The Congress, in contrast, had a single central organisation which controlled and commanded Congress parties in all provincial legislatures, but Congress victories had come in Hindu majority provinces mainly and proved it to be a power there. The important conclusion to be drawn from the results of the 1937 elections was that a religious balance had emerged—Congress victories were won only in Hindu majority provinces; in Muslim

<sup>7</sup> *The Indian Annual Register*, January-June, 1937, Vol. I, pp. 42 & 168a-168b.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 168f-168p.



support for his resolutions: (1) acquiescing in the Communal Award, (2) criticizing but not rejecting the provincial part, and (3) condemning the federal part as "fundamentally bad and totally unacceptable". Jinnah had hoped that this alliance in the Central Legislature would be continued and extended to the provinces through the elections and thereafter in the formation of the Ministries too. The Muslim League was the only all India party other than the Congress and Jinnah was anxious to co-operate with the latter. Thus the Muslim League election manifesto, drafted under his direction, was very similar to that of the Congress. On the question of the Act of 1935 it was similar to Jinnah's stand in the Central Legislature. But the most important part of that manifesto was the one devoted to recounting the Lucknow Pact and talking of the co-operation between Hindus and Muslims. The obvious implication was that Jinnah was endeavouring for a revival of the Congress-League agreement of 1916.<sup>5</sup>

The elections under the Act of 1935 were held in 1937 in which the Congress won clear majorities in five provinces,<sup>6</sup> though of a total of 1771 seats in all provincial Assemblies the Congress share was only 762 seats—less than half of the total. Moreover, 211 Hindu seats were won by non-Congressites. All these Congress victories came in Hindu majority provinces. In the Muslim majority provinces, in contrast, Congress fared badly. It won only 54 out of 250 seats in Bengal, 18

<sup>5</sup> Coupland, *op . cit.*, pp. 150-153.

<sup>6</sup> U. P., Madras, C. P., Bihar and Orissa. In Bombay Congress won nearly half the seats and was assured support by other pro-Congress groups. In the N.W.F.P. the Red Shirts aligned with the Congress. In Assam Congress was the strongest party with 35 out of 108 seats.



munities and parties to secure such future constitution for India as would be acceptable to the country.<sup>3</sup>

Jinnah had also, as one of his first acts in the Central Legislature—to which he was again elected in 1934 by the Bombay Muslims while he was himself in England—condemned the Act of 1935 but excluded the Communal Award. He was critical of the Act of 1935 for it contained provisions for a strong Centre, which the Muslims were resolved never to concede, but he still advised his followers to work the part in the Act pertaining to provincial autonomy. The Congress, on the other side, rejected the Act for not going far enough, and thus, by implication rejected the Communal Award for going too far without saying so.<sup>4</sup>

Having rejected the Act the Congress should have also been against accepting office under it, but on this point there were two views. Jawaharlal Nehru, the Congress President in 1936, wanted this 'charter of slavery to be rejected root and branch'. He wanted the Congress to contest elections but not to accept office for that would involve co-operation with British imperialism. Other prominent Congressmen were, however, eager to enter governments in order to introduce reforms.

Jinnah, as mentioned earlier, had been co-operating with the Congress since his return to India and had worked for the revival of the 1916 *entente*. Though critical of the Act, Jinnah was opposed to rejecting it wholesale. As the leader of the Muslim Independents in the Central Legislature, Jinnah had secured Congress

<sup>3</sup> In Saiyid, *op. cit.*, p. 225.

<sup>4</sup> *The London Times*, April 8, 1935.



## THE WORKING OF PROVINCIAL AUTONOMY

The expected constitutional advance embodying the Communal Award came in the form of the Government of India Act of 1935. The act pleased none: the Hindus opposed it for too many safeguards because that prevented their supremacy; and the Muslims opposed it because it created a strong Centre with the possibility of Hindu domination.<sup>1</sup> Thus, even before the Act had received royal assent, but after its main principles had been announced, Indian reaction had become hostile. Gandhi once again championed absolute independence and embarked upon uniting the various groups under his leadership in order to oppose the proposed constitution. He was even reported to be "making common cause with the accredited Muslim leader Jinnah (who had recently replaced the pro-British Aga Khan as the leader of Indian Muslims), whose 'India for Indians' policy is scarcely less nationalistic than his own."<sup>2</sup>

Jinnah was not very happy at the Communal Award, because Indians themselves had not negotiated it, but he had already advised the Council of the Muslim League in April 1934 to

accept the Communal Award so far as it goes until a substitute is agreed upon by the various com-

<sup>1</sup> *The London Times*, April 8, 1935.

<sup>2</sup> *The New York Times*, February 10, 1935.



nor could I make the Musalmans realise their precarious position. I felt so disappointed and so depressed that I decided to settle down in London. Not that I did not love India; but I felt utterly helpless.<sup>23</sup>

During the period of Jinnah's absence from India Muslim politics had touched its lowest ebb; Muslim nationalism had no articulator. Jinnah had settled down to practise law before the bar of the Privy Council where he was considered most successful,<sup>24</sup> and it seemed nothing would move him from the security of his home in Hampstead. But in 1933 Liaquat Ali Khan, who had met Jinnah at the fateful Calcutta Conference in 1928 where Jinnah was humiliated, came to England on his honeymoon, met Jinnah and pleaded with him: "You must come back. The people need you. You alone can put new life into the League and save it."<sup>25</sup>

Jinnah came back to India in 1934, travelled extensively in 1934-35, and after a few trips to England returned to India to take up the threads of Muslim politics.

<sup>23</sup> Jinnah's speech delivered at the Muslim University Union, Aligarh, February 5, 1938, in Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

<sup>24</sup> The Rt. Hon'ble The Lord Spens, in an interview to the author, in London, 1967. Lord Spens was Jinnah's colleague at that time and later, 1943-46, was the Chief Justice of India.

<sup>25</sup> Narration by Begum Liaquat Ali Khan, in an interview to the author, in Karachi, 1969.



The Communal Award was not expected to satisfy anybody fully. Muslim extremists were unhappy at the inadequate Muslim representation in the Punjab and Bengal. The Sikhs were resentful of Muslim representation in the Punjab because they considered it excessive and Gandhi intended to undertake a fast unto death as a result of the Award, particularly because the Award would disrupt Hinduism by giving separate representation to the Untouchables.<sup>22</sup> Various efforts were made by the so-called unity conferences to reach a Hindu-Muslim-Sikh accord, but their proposals were rejected by the All-India Muslim Conference and the Muslim League.

The Third Round Table Conference met with only 46 delegates. Not much was accomplished and the era of Round Table Conferences came to an end.

After the First Round Table Conference in 1931 Jinnah had decided to settle down in England because, as he said later,

I received the shock of my life at the Round Table Conference. In the face of danger the Hindu sentiment, the Hindu mind, the Hindu attitude led me to the conclusion that there was no hope of unity. I felt very pessimistic about my country... The Musalmans were like the 'No Man's Land'; they were led by either the flunkeys of the British Government or the camp-followers of the Congress. Whenever attempts were made to organize the Muslims, toadies and flunkies on the one hand and traitors in the Congress camp on the other frustrated the efforts. I began to feel that neither could I help India, nor change the Hindu mentality;

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, September 13, 1932.



to boycott the Third Round Table Conference if the Government did not satisfy them.<sup>18</sup> The British Government declared its willingness to settle the communal problem itself, enabling the All India Muslim Conference to withdraw its resolution of boycott.<sup>19</sup> The Hindu members of the Indian Legislative Assembly, however, were provoked by the demands of the Muslim Conference and declared that any surrender by the Government to Muslims would amount to an expropriation of Hindu rights without Hindu consent. They invited the Untouchables

to enter into an offensive and defensive alliance to combat the wild demands of the Muslims.... Any yielding to the impossible, preposterous claims of a vociferous, rabid community will meet bitter resistance by the nationalist minded people of the Sikh and Hindu communities.<sup>20</sup>

It was in this atmosphere that on August 4, 1932 the British Cabinet approved the text of the communal settlement and on August 16, 1932 the Communal Award was announced. It provided separate electorates for Muslims for the next ten years (until the next decennial review), excess Muslim representation in Hindu majority provinces but only 48 per cent representation in Bengal and 49 per cent in the Punjab.<sup>21</sup> Later, in November 1932 when the Third Round Table Conference met, Britain gave Muslims 33 1/3 per cent representation in the Central Legislature. The Award also gave safeguards to the Untouchables.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, March 18, 1932.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, March 22, 1932.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, April 2, 1932.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, August 17, 1932.



Gandhi-Irwin Pact, which achieved nothing except to convince Gandhi that he represented the Congress and that the Congress stood as the intermediary between the British and the Indian public. This presumption of Gandhi was to have serious consequences on the political fortunes of India in the coming years.

Against the backdrop of these riots the Second Round Table Conference met with Gandhi as the sole representative of the Congress. Gandhi was urged<sup>15</sup> to show magnanimity to the minorities, but he insisted on Muslim acceptance of the Nehru Report. With the exception of the Sikhs, all other minorities issued a joint statement of their demands but Gandhi refused to take cognizance of it. He also claimed that Congress alone represented India, asserted that Hindus and Muslims should live together and rejected the need for safeguards and separate electorates. He was uncompromising and treated minority delegates with condescension.<sup>16</sup> In the end he returned empty-handed and unrest in India increased.

Jinnah, who had stayed on in England, warned the British Government that its policy of repression would only push the Congress into the hands of the extremists. He advised the Government to convert its promises into deeds and give "a measure of responsible self-government at the Centre" in India. "A two-handed policy—a firm right hand and a generous left hand—will bring peace. A single handed policy—a firm hand alone—will bring disorder."<sup>17</sup>

In India, Muslim leaders were restive at British non-compliance of their demands and were threatening

<sup>15</sup> By the *Manchester Guardian*, October 1, 1931.

<sup>16</sup> Aziz, *op. cit.*, p. 126.

<sup>17</sup> *The New York Times*, January 4, 1932.



tish Prime Minister, had separate meetings with Hindu and Muslim delegates<sup>11</sup> but found himself unable to break the deadlock. The delegates might have been able to work out an acceptable formula, but their hands were tied by the telegrams from India protesting against concessions.<sup>12</sup> Finally the communal question had to be left to a sub-committee of the Round Table Conference presided over by the Prime Minister but mainly composed of Indians. Jinnah and Sapru declined to serve on the sub-committee because they had little hope of reaching an agreement due to the pressure of the extremists on both sides, though these two were reported to be the 'most reasonable and unprejudiced members of their respective groups.'<sup>13</sup> No solution could be reached and the First Round Table Conference ended inconclusively as far as the communal problem was concerned.

While the Conference in London was groping for a formula to resolve the tangled communal problem, in India riots had broken out as a result of Congress volunteers forcing Muslim merchants to close their shops on March 24, 1931 in mourning for the executed terrorist Bhagat Singh.<sup>14</sup> Muslims, whose life had already been disturbed and who felt that they had unnecessarily suffered on account of the prolonged civil disobedience, had no sympathy either for civil disobedience or Bhagat Singh's activities. All this took place within days of the

<sup>11</sup> Jinnah, Mohamed Ali, Sir Sultan Ahmad and the Aga Khan for Muslims, Srinivasa Sastri, Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, M. R. Jayakar, and Dr. Moonje for Hindus.

<sup>12</sup> *The New York Times*, December 15, 1930.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, December 16, 1930.

<sup>14</sup> *The Daily Telegraph*, March 26, 1931, *The Manchester Guardian*, March 26, 1931, and *The London Times*, June 9, 1931.



policy or creed of civil disobedience which he characterised as unwise and impracticable. He earnestly called on all to show patience until the London Conference had been held,<sup>5</sup> and just to ignore the recently published Simon Report with which they disagreed.<sup>6</sup> Soon thereafter, an All-India Muslim Conference, under the presidentship of Shaukat Ali, brought together a motley collection of Muslim legislators, landowners, Khilafatists and "leaders of the wild frontier,"<sup>7</sup> to consider the Simon Report. The Simon recommendations were rejected because they were unsatisfactory on Muslim representation in the legislatures and on the introduction of reforms in the N.W.F.P. But the Muslim Conference kept the door open by accepting the invitation to the Round Table Conference.

The first Round Table Conference met in November 1930. Gandhi was in jail in India and there was no Congress representation in the Conference. Efforts to get Hindus and Muslims to agree on the communal problem initially seemed to be meeting with success and it was reported that an agreed solution could emerge<sup>8</sup> but such hopes proved false and within two weeks Hindus and Muslims were at each other's throats.<sup>9</sup> The Muslims were adamant on the 'Muslim Charter' which was based upon Jinnah's Fourteen Points. The Hindus were mainly opposed to Muslim majority in the Punjab and Bengal legislatures and to separate electorates.<sup>10</sup> J. Ramsay Macdonald, the Bri-

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, May 4, 1930.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, June 25, 1930.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, July 5, 1930.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, November 3, 1930.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, November 15, 1930.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, December 11, 1930.



## THE POLITICS OF THE ROUND TABLE CONFERENCES

The first Indian adventure in the production of a self-determined constitution had come to naught, but on October 31, 1929 the Viceroy, Lord Irwin, declared Dominion Status to be the natural goal and ultimate purpose of the British policy in India and invited Indian leaders to a Round Table Conference in London.<sup>1</sup> Gandhi, Motilal Nehru and other Congress leaders met the Viceroy to present the Congress case.<sup>2</sup>

The Congress asked the Viceroy to guarantee that the purpose of the Round Table Conference was to produce a constitution for a self-governing Indian Dominion, which the Viceroy was unable to do. Consequently, the Congress started on the warpath once again, by adopting a resolution sponsored by Gandhi to start a campaign of civil disobedience, including the non-payment of taxes.<sup>3</sup> The campaign led to nowhere and the Government decided to arrest Gandhi.<sup>4</sup> Jinnah, on the other hand, issued an important statement advising "all my countrymen, particularly the Muslims" not to associate themselves with the methods,

<sup>1</sup> *The New York Times*, November 1, 1929.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, November 24, 1929.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, December 27, 1929.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, May 1, 1930.



Nehru Report on account of joint electorates contained therein.

5. Supporters of reconciliation between Hindus and Muslims but opposed to the Nehru Report, who were under Jinnah's leadership.<sup>25</sup>

The Jinnah group was the one which had taken the lead in inviting all Muslims to assemble under the banner of the League for the purpose of formulating a policy so that Hindus and Muslims could meet on a common ground. This 'larger national cause' could not be served, but success was achieved in outlining a programme on which Muslims themselves could unite. The programme was defined by Jinnah in what later became famous as his 'Fourteen Points'. The Muslim demands included a federal form of constitution for India, with residuary powers vested in the provinces; effective representation of the minorities in the provincial legislatures, Muslim representation in the Central Legislature being at least one-third; continuation of the system of separate electorates; Sindh, Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier to be full fledged provinces; adequate share for the Muslims in the Services of the State; not less than one-third Muslim representation in the Central and Provincial Cabinets; amendment of the constitution with the concurrence of the provinces; and dropping of bills in a legislature if three-fourths of the members of any community in that body oppose it.

<sup>25</sup> Saiyid, *op. cit.*, p. 195.



disowned by every minority.<sup>22</sup> Notwithstanding the rejection of the Report by the minorities and the general criticism it received, Gandhi issued an ultimatum to the British Government that if it did not accept the Nehru Report in its entirety and implement the Dominion Status Constitution for India by the end of 1929, the Congress would organize a non-violent non-cooperation movement.<sup>23</sup>

The session of the All India Muslim League that met in Delhi in the aftermath of the All Parties National Convention found the League torn with internal dissensions. A five-way split in the League ranks produced the following groupings:

1. Supporters of the Simon Commission led by Sir Muhammad Shafi.
2. Supporters of the Aga Khan who formed themselves into the Muslim Conference. (The Aga Khan had advised his supporters not to indulge in violence even under the most provocative circumstances, to remain loyal and to give every help to the Government in maintaining law and order.<sup>24</sup>)
3. Unconditional supporters of the Nehru Report, who formed themselves into an All India Nationalist Muslim Party in July 1929. They were to merge in the Congress and to be the small group of nationalist Muslims to advise and guide Gandhi on matters pertaining to Muslims.
4. Supporters of the proposals of the Delhi Muslim Conference of 1927, who rejected the

<sup>22</sup> *The Manchester Guardian*, August 17, 1928.

<sup>23</sup> *The New York Times*, December 27 and 29, 1928.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, January 6, 1929.



the Muslims.<sup>15</sup> Jamshed Nusserwanjee, a Parsee and Mayor of Karachi, told Jinnah's biographer:

The first time I saw (Jinnah) weep was after his amendments had been rejected at the Calcutta meeting to consider the Nehru Report....<sup>16</sup>

On leaving Calcutta, Jinnah, with tears in his eyes, said to Nusserwanjee, "Jamshed, this is the parting of the ways."<sup>17</sup> For the Muslims, this was the end of their support for the Congress and from then on the Congress was to be almost completely a Hindu body.

The reaction to the Report was hostile in many minority groups. Not only the Muslims, the depressed classes, the Christians and the Sikhs also rejected the Report. Sardar Mangal Singh, the Sikh member of the Nehru Committee was even driven out of his Secretaryship of the Sikh League for his part in the Report.<sup>18</sup> Shoaib Qureshi and Sayyid Ali Imam, the Muslim members, had actually never been recognized as representatives of any major Muslim organisation.

The Congress, however, accepted the Report and congratulated the members of the Committee on their work.<sup>19</sup> The general non-Indian comment on the Report was that it provided for government by the narrowest caste oligarchy,<sup>20</sup> a meaningless utopia; a scheme for the establishment of Hindu Raj.<sup>21</sup> The Report was also branded a worthless scrap of paper

<sup>15</sup> Abid Husain, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

<sup>16</sup> Bolitho, *op. cit.*, p. 95. Also given in Abid Husain, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>18</sup> K. K. Aziz, *Britain and Muslim India*, Heinemann, London, 1963, p. 91.

<sup>19</sup> *The London Times*, November 5, 1928.

<sup>20</sup> *The Empire Review*, December 1929, p. 414.

<sup>21</sup> *The London Times*, September 8, 1928.



to take the case of the Muslims to the Convention itself. He pleaded the Muslim case, requesting the Convention and the majority community to show magnanimity and accept Muslim demands as presented by the Muslim Conference of 1927 and by the joint League-Khilafat delegation. He pointed out that the Muslim minority in India needed safeguards because it was a cultural and religious minority and therefore its status was unalterable.<sup>11</sup>

I am exceedingly sorry that the Report of the Committee is neither helpful nor fruitful in any way whatsoever...I think it will be recognized that it is absolutely essential to our progress, that a Hindu-Muslim settlement should be reached, and that all communities should live in a friendly and harmonious spirit in this vast country of ours.<sup>12</sup>

And finally Jinnah warned that the inevitable result of any constitution, under which minorities felt insecure, was "revolution and civil war."<sup>13</sup>

Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, the leader of the Liberals, supported Jinnah, but M. R. Jayakar, the Bombay Mahasabha leader, warned the Convention that the Report and the Draft Constitution had already been accepted by many organizations and their amendment would reopen the question with the possibility of rejection.<sup>14</sup> In the end Jinnah's amendments were rejected. Not only that, but he was taunted that he spoke for none else but himself and had no right to represent

<sup>11</sup> Saiyid, *op. cit.*, pp. 190-94.

<sup>12</sup> In H. Bolitho, *Jinnah, Creator of Pakistan*, John Murray, London, reprinted 1964, p. 94.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>14</sup> Saiyid, *op. cit.*, p. 193.



undertook the preparation of an agreed constitution,<sup>9</sup> but the Hindu-Muslim question marred its programme and with great difficulty a sub-committee of eight<sup>10</sup> under the chairmanship of Pandit Motilal Nehru, could produce the famous Nehru Report, published later in August.

For the Muslims the major points of the Nehru Report provided for the establishment of the N.W.F.P. as a Governor's province, separation of Sindh from Bombay, the elevation of Baluchistan to the level of a Governor's province (this point came out in the revision of the Report a year later), reservation of seats only at the Centre, and in Muslim majority provinces, no weightage and no separate electorates.

An All Parties National Convention was called on November 22, 1928 in order to secure general approval of the Nehru Report and the Draft Constitution prepared by the Nehru Committee. The League was also invited and Jinnah, as its President, managed to prevail upon the Central Khilafat Committee—which had decided to boycott the Convention—to join the League for a united representation of the Muslim view-point. The League proposals were presented in the form of amendments to the Draft Constitution and included one-third representation for Muslims in the Central Legislature, Muslim representation in proportion to their population in the Punjab and Bengal, and the allocation of residuary powers to the provinces, not to the Centre. The sub-committee of the Convention that considered these proposals rejected all of them. Jinnah then decided

<sup>9</sup> *The New York Times*, August 15, 1928.

<sup>10</sup> Motilal Nehru, Chairman, Tej Bahadur Sapru, S. C. Bose, E. R. Pradhan, Sayyid Ali Imam, Shoaib Qureshi and Mangal Singh, members.



thereby securing a solid Moslem support, and leaving Jinnah high and dry.<sup>6</sup>

Thus at one of the crucial moments of Indian political development Muslims could not be effective because of their internal divisions.

Jinnah was still hoping for a constitutional formula which would safeguard Muslim interests within a united India, inevitably moving towards self-government. On March 20, 1927 Jinnah had presided over a Conference of Muslim leaders in Delhi which evolved a formula that provided for the addition of three Governor's provinces—Sindh, the N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan—with Muslim majorities, the increase in Muslim representation in the Punjab and Bengal to the proportion of their population, and the allocation of one-third of seats for Muslims in the Central Legislature. In return, the Muslims agreed to joint electorates. The proposals were subject to ratification by the League and Congress. But in the meantime, *The Hindustan Times*, representing Hindu reaction, demanded that if Muslims wanted majorities in Sindh, the N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan, then the Hindus may want the Punjab and Bengal to be reconstituted in order to eliminate Muslim majorities there, and it did not consider the acceptance of joint electorates by Muslims as a satisfactory price.<sup>7</sup> The Congress did agree to the proposals in May 1927, but this Congress acceptance was not acceptable to most Hindus and communal riots broke out all over India.<sup>8</sup>

In 1928, an All Parties Conference, formed to assemble all boycotters of the Simon Commission,

<sup>6</sup> Birkenhead, *op. cit.*, p. 255, italics mine.

<sup>7</sup> Saiyid, *op. cit.*, p. 169.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 170.



allenge issued earlier by Birkenhead in the House of Lords:

Let them produce a constitution which carries behind it a fair measure of general agreement among the great peoples of India.<sup>2</sup>

On the question of boycott the League was split between the Sir Muhammad Shafi group and the Jinnah group. Shafi, President of the Punjab Muslim League, attributed the exclusion of Indians to intercommunal hatred<sup>3</sup> but agreed to co-operate with the Commission, and his Muslim League sent a message of welcome to the Commission hoping that the interests of the minorities would be safeguarded.<sup>4</sup> But the Congress, in its meeting in Madras on December 27, 1927, had unanimously adopted a resolution for a total boycott of the Commission.<sup>5</sup> The faction of the League under Jinnah had joined the non-co-operators, which provoked the wrath of the Secretary of State who wrote to the Viceroy:

I should advise Simon to see at all stages important people who are not boycotting the Commission, particularly Moslems and the depressed classes. I should widely advertise all his interviews with representative Moslems. The whole policy now is obvious. It is to terrify the immense Hindu population by the apprehension that the Commission is being got hold by the Moslems and may present a report altogether destructive of the Hindu position,

<sup>2</sup> The Earl of Birkenhead, Frederick Edwin, *The Earl of Birkenhead*, Thornton Butterworth Ltd., London, 1935.

<sup>3</sup> *The New York Times*, November 10, 1927.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, February 4, 1928.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, December 28, 1927.



## SIMON COMMISSION, NEHRU REPORT AND JINNAH'S FOURTEEN POINTS

In the period following the end of the Khilafat Movement, 1926-36, political initiative seemed to have passed on to Britain and in terms of nationalist political activity not much of significance happened in India, with the exception of the commotion caused by the Simon Commission and the Nehru Report. The focus of attention had shifted from India to London where major decisions pertaining to constitutional developments in India were to be taken.

The announcement of the appointment of the Simon Commission was made on November 8, 1927, two years before it was originally intended. The exclusively English composition of the Commission aroused the ire of all political elements in India. Lord Birkenhead, the Secretary of State for India, gave as reason that with Indian members on the Commission there was bound to be a Hindu report and a Muslim report.<sup>1</sup> The non-Indian character of the Simon Commission aroused two responses in India: boycott of the Commission on one side and on the other the acceptance of the chal-

<sup>1</sup> A better and more genuine reason Birkenhead should have given was that, it being a Joint Parliamentary Commission, obviously no Indian could be included in it.



you mean your methods and your programme, I am afraid I cannot accept them; for I am fully convinced that it must lead to disaster.”<sup>7</sup> Jinnah had “scented danger in all that was happening, and saw in this mass awakening a symbol of Hindu revivalism—a threat to his own community”<sup>8</sup> and wrote to Gandhi in 1920 accusing him of having “already caused split and division in almost every institution you have approached hitherto.”<sup>9</sup> Jinnah left the Congress in 1920 never to return to it, though he continued co-operating with it until 1937. While acknowledging that Jinnah “had largely been responsible in the past for bringing the Moslem League nearer to the Congress,”<sup>10</sup> Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, in an unkind cut, attributed motives of personal snobbery to his leaving Congress: “He disagreed on political grounds, but it was not politics in the main that kept him away”,<sup>11</sup> rather the uncouth character of the masses that had now come in Congress and demanded speeches in Hindustani.<sup>12</sup>

Though Jinnah left the Congress he did not become politically inactive. He maintained his relationship with the Muslim League and, as its President in 1924, Jinnah exhorted the Muslims to organize themselves under the banner of the League because the Hindus were organized. Hindu-Muslim entente could not be achieved without both parties being equally organized.

<sup>7</sup> Saiyid, *op. cit.*, p. 129.

<sup>8</sup> Sasadhar Sinha, *Indian Independence in Perspective*, Asia Publishing House, New York, 1964, p. 51.

<sup>9</sup> In Moon, *op. cit.*, p. 270.

<sup>10</sup> Jawaharlal Nehru, *An Autobiography*, John Lane, The Bodley Head, London, reprinted 1941, p. 67.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 68.



gress comrades, Jinnah, already in 1916, was advocating that Muslim representation to various legislatures should be secured...by means of separate electorates...The demand for separate electorates is not a matter of policy but a matter of necessity to the Muslims, who require to be roused from the coma and torpor into which they had fallen so long.<sup>4</sup>

Though advocating separate electorates, or perhaps because separate electorates had been accepted by the Hindus, Jinnah was hopeful of Hindu-Muslim co-operation. In 1917 he brushed aside the threat of Hindu domination by saying

Fear not...this is a bogey which is put before you to scare you away from the co-operation and unity which are essential to self-government.<sup>5</sup>

The growing influence of Gandhi set Congress on the uncharted path of civil disobedience based on the ancient Hindu belief of *ahimsa* and in general gave Congress "a more pronounced Hindu complexion."<sup>6</sup> Jinnah was opposed to the religious, metaphysical politics of Gandhi as well as to the abandonment of constitutional means. In 1920 he was the only person out of more than 14,000 delegates in the Congress *pandal* to speak out against the use of civil disobedience for the Khilafat cause, which in any case he had never favoured. He rejected Gandhi's invitation to join the politics of mass agitation because "If by 'new life'

<sup>4</sup> Jinnah's presidential address to the XVI Bombay Provincial Conference held in Ahmedabad in 1916, in M. H. Saiyid, *Jinnah, A Political Study*, Ashraf, Lahore, 1952, reprinted 1962, pp. 66-67.

<sup>5</sup> In P. Moon, *Divide and Quit*, University of California Press, 1962, p. 270.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*



opposed to the demand of separate electorates and did not join the Muslim League until 1913.<sup>1</sup> When he did join it in London at the persuasion of Maulana Mahomed Ali and Syed Wazir Hasan, he made a condition that his League membership would not be a bar to the larger national cause he was working for. But this stipulation seems to be directed more against the League creed of loyalty to the British Crown than against the Muslim character of the League, for not only had he accepted election to the Imperial Legislative Council in 1910 by the Muslims of Bombay, but one of his earliest actions as a legislator was to introduce the Muslim Waqf Property Bill in that legislature. It was also on a resolution on Muslim Waqf Property that he delivered his first speech in the Congress in 1906. True, under his presidentship he steered the League to come closer to the Congress and adopt similar resolutions, which it did between 1915 and 1922, and in 1916 he and Tilak fathered the Lucknow Pact for the League and the Congress (though the Congress President in 1916 was A. C. Majumdar) respectively. But the Lucknow Pact was based upon the Congress recognition of the League as the spokesman of the Muslims and the accommodation of specific Muslim demands for their safeguards. Though initially opposed to separate electorates for Muslims,<sup>2</sup> and proclaimed "an acknowledged 'ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity'"<sup>3</sup> by his Cong-

<sup>1</sup> The year in which the Aga Khan, who had been the recognized Muslim leader, left the League on account of its change of creed from loyalty to self-government.

<sup>2</sup> Jinnah had signed a memorandum opposing the separate electorates of 1906. See V. N. Naik, *Mr. Jinnah: A Political Study*, Sudhbhakti Publications, Bombay, 1947, p. 15.

<sup>3</sup> Sarojini Naidu, *Mohammed Ali Jinnah, An Ambassador of Unity*, Ganesh & Co., Madras, 1918, p. x.



## JINNAH BECOMES THE SYMBOL OF MUSLIM NATIONALISM

Politics in India has always been dominated by personalities. As Gandhi came to symbolize Hindu nationalism from 1919 onwards, so did Jinnah symbolize Muslim nationalism from 1936 onwards. It took Gandhi three years after his return from South Africa to dominate the Congress, after the deaths of Gopal Krishna Gokhale and Balgangadhar Tilak; it took Jinnah thirty years to dominate the politics of the Muslims. Jinnah had returned to India twenty years before Gandhi and had been politically active throughout. The leadership of Indian Muslims, however, had been in the hands first of the loyalists—the Aga Khan, Vaqar-ul-Mulk and Syed Ameer Ali—then in the hands of the agitationists—Maulana Mahomed Ali, Maulana Shaukat Ali and Maulana Abul Kalam Azad—and thereafter, between 1926 and 1936, there were no dominant leaders. It was only in the final phase, after the Aga Khan had retired to Europe, Maulana Azad had irrevocably committed himself to Congress, and after Mahomed Ali and other leaders had died, that Jinnah came to dominate the League and became the symbol of Muslim nationalism.

Jinnah started out as an Indian nationalist in 1906 when he first attended the Congress session. He was



begun for the heritage of place and power it would some day leave behind it.<sup>9</sup>

The *entente* under Khilafat auspices was confined to the leadership level; at the popular level Hindu-Muslim antagonism was as strong as ever, as shown by the riots.

The emotional fervour aroused by the Khilafat agitation had almost completely engulfed the Muslims of India. Its failure made them return to Indian horizons. Their fears of Hindu domination reasserted themselves and the fraternalism of 1921 was overcome by communal bitterness due to the intermittent Hindu-Muslim riots. The sweep of the wild-fire of the Khilafat agitation had on the one side almost nullified the existence of the Muslim League, and though attempts under Jinnah's leadership were made in 1924 to breathe life into it and gather Muslims under its banner, no enduring success was achieved. On the other side, with the collapse of non-co-operation, Muslims had broken away from the Congress, which was itself torn with dissensions. Gandhi had retired from politics and Hasrat Mohani and Lajpat Rai were talking of separate Hindu-Muslim States. Lord Reading had been replaced by Lord Irwin as Viceroy in 1926. The trial of strength of the early twenties had been inconclusive and India was in the grip of a sullen mood.

<sup>9</sup> R. Coupland, *India, A Restatement*, Oxford, 1945, p. 123.



ism<sup>7</sup> accepted and accommodated the demands of Muslim nationalism. But from 1926 onwards Hindu nationalism was to repudiate the Lucknow Pact and adamantly deny Muslim demands for safeguards. Never again was the spirit of accommodation and co-operation to pervade the Indian political atmosphere. It was also only during this decade that Congress had five Muslim Presidents, compared to two before and one afterwards in the whole history of the Indian National Congress.

Being an extra-territorial demand and campaigned for by non-violent civil disobedience, the Khilafat Movement had the germs of self-destruction in it. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk's abolition of the Sultanate and then the Caliphate pulled the rug from under the Muslim feet, and civil disobedience got out of hand—as it was bound to—resulting in almost continuous Hindu-Muslim riots from 1921 to 1924.<sup>8</sup> Neither Muslim nor Hindu leaders strongly condemned the atrocities committed by their respective communities. Hindu-Muslim unity, like the gush of a geyser, had caught the imagination of the whole of India. But the geyser, after playing for a while, was stopped by mutual recriminations and suspicions, never to gush out again. Thus it can be seen that

behind the facade of a united nationalist campaign against the British Raj a struggle had already

<sup>7</sup> Proponents of Indian unity may, as they did in the past, insist upon Congress as the manifestation of Indian nationalism. But it can't be refuted that Congress had an overwhelming Hindu majority; it was dominated by Hindus and was bound to reflect the Hindu point of view, no matter what name may be given to it.

<sup>8</sup> For details of riots see Ram Gopal, *Indian Muslims, A Political History*, Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1959, pp. 157-58.



to Indian Muslims. Their part consisted in making sacrifices only: going to jail in large numbers, withdrawing from educational institutions and even trying to destroy the Aligarh Muslim University<sup>5</sup>—all this fitted very well into Gandhi's scheme of non-violent non-cooperation for pressuring the Government on behalf of *Swaraj*. However, the Muslims did derive some unplanned but crucial advantages that greatly contributed to the later development and strengthening of Muslim nationalism. The Khilafat Movement brought top Muslim personalities of India to the forefront of agitational politics who unconsciously created a great deal of political awakening in the Muslim masses and taught them the techniques of organizing large demonstrations.<sup>6</sup> Until the time of the Khilafat Movement Muslim politics in India had mainly centred on loyalty to the British Crown with only a faint and almost unnoticed spark in the form of the 1913 change in the creed of the Muslim League. But now the foundation was laid that was to catapult them onto the Indian political stage as the third party, though they had to wait for one whole decade and for the return of the prodigal—Jinnah—from his self-imposed retirement in England before being recognized as a party to be reckoned with.

The period 1916-26 also marks the beginning and the end of Indian nationalism—overriding separate Hindu and Muslim nationalisms. In the Lucknow Pact of 1916, Congress recognized the right of the Muslim League to speak for the Muslims, and Hindu national-

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 278.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*



From 1916 to 1922 the annual sessions of the League and the Congress were held simultaneously and by 1922 there was no difference in their resolutions. In 1919 started the Khilafat Movement, at the initiative of the Muslims, but with the whole-hearted and enthusiastic support of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi and under his leadership. The Khilafat Movement almost merged Muslim nationalism with Hindu nationalism. Several Hindu leaders—Congress as well as non-Congress—voiced their apprehension on this undertaking, but Gandhi remained adamant and managed to carry the Congress with himself. Gandhi, by throwing his weight behind Khilafat,

achieved a dual purpose. He carried the Congress plan of winning over the Muslims to its culmination. Secondly, he made the Congress a power in the country, which it would not have been if the Muslims had not joined it.<sup>3</sup>

Muslims needed Hindu support for bringing maximum pressure on the British—the Government of India and the Imperial Government—and Gandhi visualized the achievement of *Swaraj* through Hindu-Muslim unity as well as the protection of the cow—by voluntary Muslim renunciation of cow slaughter—without making his support conditional.

Later assessments<sup>4</sup> of the Congress-Khilafat bargain have found that, while the benefits stipulated for Hindus would have been tangible and immediate had the plan succeeded, for the Muslims it was an adventure in altruism because the Khilafat Movement had neither an Indian programme nor would its benefits have gone

<sup>3</sup> Ambedkar, *op. cit.*, p. 142.

<sup>4</sup> e. g., I. H. Qureshi, *The Muslim Community of the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent, 610-1947*, Mouton & Co., The Hague, 1962.



society to a nationalist organisation, and as the chances of Hindu participation in government increased,

Muslim fears took shape in practical form. That moment was 1906 and the form that of the Muslim League. Henceforth, the rhythm of increased Hindu power and increased Muslim distrust and demand for safeguards was almost continuous, only smothered for a few years by mass *Khilafat* emotion.<sup>2</sup>

However, the Aga Khan deputation to Lord Minto in 1906 had secured the Viceroy's consent to separate electorates for Muslims, which a reluctant Lord Morley did finally incorporate in the Government of India Act, 1909. But Muslim gratefulness to the British did not last long. The defeat of Turkey at the hands of her former subjects in the decade preceding World War I convinced the Indian Muslim that Britain had designs against the realm of the Sultan-Caliph, and therefore the Muslim world. Nearer home, the partition of Bengal was annulled in 1911—in the Delhi Durbar through the lips of the King-Emperor himself. Thus in 1913 the League objective was changed from loyalty to self-government suitable to India. Only the word suitable distinguished the League from the Congress which demanded unqualified self-government.

The decade following was one of unmitigated Indian nationalism, if any decade can be so designated. In the Lucknow Pact of 1916 the Congress conceded separate electorates to Muslims who in turn gave up their voting rights in general electorates. Muslims also accepted the principle of majority rule, constitutional objective of the Congress and its political philosophy, thus abandoning Sayyid Ahmed Khan's advice.

<sup>2</sup> P. Spear, "The Political Evolution of Pakistan," in S. Rose (ed.), *Politics in Southern Asia*, Macmillan, London, 1963, p. 36.



to some writers,<sup>1</sup> go to the days of Muhammad bin Qasim, but it was mainly during the 18th century, as a reaction to the decline of Muslim power, on the one side, and to Hindu renaissance and revival movements on the other, that efforts at the purification of Indian Islam by scholars such as Shah Wali Ullah and Shah Abdul Aziz, and religious zealots such as Syed Ahmad Shaheed breathed life into the Muslim consciousness of a separate identity. A better date for the start of the nationalist movement in India is 1885 when the Indian National Congress came into existence. As Congress increasingly grew into a political, nationalist organisation, Muslim political nationalism also crystallized. The history of Muslim nationalism in India is largely a history of reaction to Congress, and never once did Muslim nationalism acquire political initiative till the 1940 Lahore Resolution. Any study of Muslim nationalism perforce has to be conducted within the orbit of Indian nationalism, or more precisely, in relation to Hindu nationalism. Initially, Muslim nationalism took the opposite road to the one taken by Hindu nationalism, for a time both ran parallel, for some time they merged in each other, thereafter they rubbed shoulders for two decades and finally they clashed.

The initial Muslim reaction to Congress was one of aloofness on the advice of Sayyid Ahmad Khan, who wanted Muslims to concentrate their energies on education and rehabilitation in the eyes of the British, because he foresaw that in the battle of numbers the ill-equipped Muslim must inevitably suffer if he did not have the support of the rulers.

As Congress graduated from an elite debating

<sup>1</sup> See for example Hafeez Malik, *op. cit.*



## FROM ISOLATION TO INTEGRATION

Ever since the downfall of the Mughal empire Muslims had tried to protect their culture by withdrawing in the face of the hostile and threatening British political and cultural imperialism. Eventually they realized that, by withdrawing, they had kept themselves uneducated and backward, lagging in professions, business and commerce, trade and industry. While the higher positions in government and business were monopolised by the English, the lower ones were all occupied by the Hindus, who had adjusted to British domination more quickly and readily than had the Muslims. Muslims groped for ways to safeguard their values and way of life as well as to get reservation of seats in legislatures and services, but they failed since no satisfactory arrangement could be made with the majority community. Their competitive capacity in face of the more advanced Hindus was negligible. Thus a political development that could eliminate Hindu competition in business and government employment would open vistas of advancement for the Muslim intelligentsia, and the elimination of Hindu landlords and Hindu money-lenders would free the Muslim peasantry.

The foundations of Muslim nationalism, according



however, never bothered to inquire whether it was enough to make India a nation by calling it so, for he knew that his success depended upon maintaining the myth of an Indian nation even if he could not prove it.<sup>16</sup>

The Muslim, on his side, kept insisting that there was still something in his Muslimness that created a community of common ideology with other Muslims in India. The Jews of Europe had lived for several centuries under different rulers in different countries, governed by different laws, speaking different languages, having different customs, eating different foods, and yet they retained, throughout a score of centuries, the yearning to assemble in the promised land and to form one body politic. The moment that hope came within the realm of the possible the scattered Jews of Europe became a nationality and on acquiring their territory they became a nation. What kept the flame of eventual salvation and deliverance kindling in the Jews for two thousand years was the feeling of oneness with other Jews and the will to share the past as well as to build a shared future. The ties—of being a minority—among Muslims were of a similar kind though not based on common persecution, as in the case of Jews, but on past glories which a Punjabi Musalman shared with a Bengali as well as a Madrasi Musalman, but not with a Punjabi Hindu or Sikh, or even with the Afghan or Iranian Muslim—the glory of the heroes, the pride of victories on the battlefield against the infidel, and the will to share a common and hopefully grand future.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*



territory.<sup>14</sup> They could emigrate if they so wished.

Neither did the Hindu understand the Muslim mind nor did the Muslim comprehend the working of the Hindu mind. The arguments of one sounded ridiculous, pernicious and mischievous to the other. The Hindu argued that in India there was no Muslim nation but Muslims who were Punjabis, Bengalis, Mad-rasis, Bombaywalas, Hindustanis, etc. who spoke the same language as others from the same area; racially they were similar to their neighbours; culturally a Punjabi Muslim had more in common with a Punjabi Hindu than with a Bengali Muslim. In several places Hindus and Muslims revered common religious saints and participated in common celebrations. Muslims were spread all over India instead of being concentrated in one area. And if Islam was the only binding characteristic, why could not the Muslims claim one nation from Morocco to Afghanistan?

In addition, it was not possible for the Hindu to admit that India was merely 'a notion and not a nation', because in the world of the 20th century nationality and nationalism were considered great virtues and "it was quite natural for the Hindus to feel...that it would be as improper for India to be without a nationality as it would be for a man to be without his clothes in a crowded assembly."<sup>15</sup> The Hindu also knew that his case for Indian independence was considerably strengthened by the assertion of India being one nation, because a nation is entitled to self-determination. He,

<sup>14</sup> Even the 1967 election manifesto of the Mahasabha mentions, as one of the party's objectives, the liberation of Indian territory presently occupied by China and Pakistan, see especially para 5.

<sup>15</sup> B. R. Ambedkar, *Pakistan or the Partition of India*, Thacker, Bombay, 3rd. ed., 1946, p. 12.



Hindu view and the Muslim view of nationality, territoriality and community. We have seen that the Hindu has been concerned more with the integrity of the territory, which he considers India and therefore his, than with the homogeneity of the group. All those who lived on this territory belonged to the Indian community and automatically became members of the Indian nation. His holy places are situated in India and the geographical entity of India with its mountain peaks, jungles, coast spots and rivers provide him with the objects of his worship. Because India is Hinduism, the Hindu's patriotism is place-oriented and is based upon territoriality.

Islam as a religion is primarily concerned with the fulfilment of revelation; it is proselytising; it is, consequently, concerned with people and therefore it is a people-oriented religion. Any territory where the flag of Islam can be unfurled and where the community of the faithful (*umma*) can live according to its own injunctions becomes *dar-al-Islam*. Placing emphasis upon people and their homogeneity, Islam has oriented Muslims to give first consideration to the Muslimness of a person, rather than the country of his origin, and this especially because Islam recognizes no bar of colour, birth or race. The moment a person becomes a Muslim he joins the community of the faithful.

Thus while the Muslim talked of his community, his nationality and his determination to achieve nationhood on the basis of people—the Muslims—the Hindu became more and more concerned with the possibility of the religious sacrilege of his sacred soil, the vivisection of Mother India. The Mahasabha, even when recognizing Muslims to be a separate nation, did not agree to their right and claim to a separate homeland on the Indian



ism in India, or of the Hindu Mahasabha, which recognized that there were two nations—Hindu and Muslim—in India, were directed at denying Muslims what they considered the logical outcome of their nationalism. In essence both parties represented the Hindu point of view, the Mahasabha openly and without mincing words, the Congress under the cloak of secular nationalism. Dr. Rajendra Prasad, Congress President in 1934 and the President of India from 1952-62, argues the case of Indian oneness in Hindu religious terms. He, therefore, could not accept the claim of Muslim nationality to a separate homeland because

...every Hindu who performs a *sandhya* has to repeat a *sloka* in the *sankalpa* in which he pictures the country as a whole and imagines the waters of the Sindhu, the Ganga, and the Cavery to be mingled together in the water of his small water-pot.... There are four places of pilgrimage which are known as the four *Dhams*, a visit to which is said to earn the greatest virtue for a Hindu. They are: Rameshevaram in the southern tip of the Peninsula, Badrikashrama deep in the Himalayas at a height of some 15,000 feet, Jagannath Puri on the east coast in Orissa, and Dwarka on the western sea coast in Kathiawar. It cannot be denied that irrespective of who rules and what were the administrative or political divisions of the country, the Hindus have never conceived of India as comprising anything less than what we regard as India today.<sup>13</sup>

There is a fundamental difference between the

<sup>13</sup> Rajendra Prasad, *India Divided*, Hind Kitabs Ltd., Bombay, 3rd rev. ed., 1947, p. 67.



eratic government in India because, as he found, Islam was a bar to the Muslims' co-operation with other Indian communities since they were always looking beyond India for protection and spiritual solace. Hindus could well manage the 70 million Muslims in India, but if these sought the help of "the armed hosts of Afghanistan, Central Asia, Arabia, Mesopotamia and Turkey" that "will be irresistible"<sup>12</sup> for the Hindus of India. Lajpat Rai's statement contains the crux of the Hindu argument: the extra-territorial orientation and connections of Indian Muslims made them dangerous to the security of India. Whether Muslims were given a separate State of their own or given equality in decision-making at the Central level, Hindu India would remain exposed. Hindu India could be protected only if the extra-territorial orientation and loyalty of the Indian Muslim were merged in the Indian nation.

The Hindus were agreeable to consider Muslim demands, but not before the departure of the British, for after the British departure Hindus and Muslims would have to deal with each other without the cushion or arbitration—or scapegoat—the British provided, and willy-nilly Muslims would agree to some safeguards in a united India, for lack of an alternative. Hence, the Hindu argument that Muslims were not a nation, therefore they were entitled neither to a separate homeland nor to constitutional equality with Hindus.

Thus, throughout the forties, efforts whether of Congress, which claimed to be a national organization and denied that there could be more than one national-

<sup>12</sup> Quoted by Jinnah in his presidential address at the All India Muslim League, Lahore Session, March 1940, in Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad (ed.), *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah*, Ashraf, Lahore, Vol. I, 1942, 6th ed., 1960, p. 157.



China belongs to us, Arabia belongs to us, so does India.

Muslims we are and we are compatriots to the whole world.<sup>8</sup>

The Muslim was at once an Indian, belonging to the polity of the subcontinent, and at the same time a Muslim, a member of the universal brotherhood of Islam. Thus the Muslim had two parallel loyalties, instead of one being superimposed upon the other. Maulana Mahomed Ali was reflecting the genuine Muslim feeling when he declared

I belong to two circles of equal size but which are not co-centric. One is India and the other is Muslim world....<sup>9</sup>

And so the Muslim intellectual was never able to "strike his roots deep into his native soil...."<sup>10</sup> He was "an intellectual exotic" who "felt that he was in India, but not of it."<sup>11</sup>

To the Muslim, his criteria of his separate nationhood was fully justified. The Hindu view was somewhat ambivalent, in that, on the one side, the Hindu regarded the Indianness of the Muslim with suspicion but, on the other, did not accept the Muslim claim to separate nationhood either. Lala Lajpat Rai, Congress President in 1907 and 1920, in a letter to C. R. Das, wrote about the impossibility of Hindu-Muslim unity and of demo-

<sup>8</sup> Muhammad Iqbal, "Tarana-i-Milli", *Bang-i-Dira*, Sh. Mubarak Ali, Lahore, reprint, 1968, p. 172.

<sup>9</sup> Maulana Mohamed Ali speaking at the Indian Round Table Conference, London, November 12, 1930-January 19, 1931, p. 96, Proceedings published by His Majesty's Stationery Office.

<sup>10</sup> Sir Jadu Nath Sarkar, *A Short History of Aurangzeb*, M.E. Sarkar, Calcutta, 1962, 3rd ed., p. 445.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*



This group loyalty has at some times focussed itself on the Muslims of India and at others on the Muslims of the world but always in contradistinction to the non-Muslims in India, particularly the Hindus.

Literature on the history of Muslims and Islam in India is replete with accounts reflective of Muslim separateness throughout even the period when they were the dominant force in the country.<sup>7</sup> In later times it was sustained by the fear of Hindu domination on one side and on the other by the yearning for an Islamic way of life. These feelings were further strengthened by the nostalgia of an empire that not long ago evoked memories of grandeur and Muslim power. The Muslim past was exclusively Muslim, unshared by Hindus, for whom it had been a long period of servitude and national humiliation. Whether in reality Muslim rule had been benevolent or malevolent had little to do with how Hindus and Muslims related themselves to it. Not only that the Hindu could hardly share with his Muslim neighbour an Indian past, the foci of their orientation and allegiance were completely unrelated. For the Hindu, India was Hinduism and the highest patriotism was the love of Mother India; for the Muslim, it was the world of Islam stretching from the Pacific to the Atlantic and from Central Asia to the heart of Africa.

<sup>7</sup> See, for example, some recent works:

Aziz Ahmad, *Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment*, Oxford, 1964.  
S. Abid Husain, *The Destiny of Indian Muslims*, Asia Publishing House, London, 1959.

Hafeez Malik, *Moslem Nationalism in India and Pakistan*, Public Affairs Press, Washington, 1963.

M. T. Titus, *Islam in India and Pakistan*, Y.M.C.A. Publishing House, Calcutta, 1959.

A. Hamid, *Muslim Separatism in India*, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1967.



The one is the possession in common of a rich heritage of memories; and the other is actual agreement, the desire to live together, and the will to continue to make the most of the joint heritage.<sup>5</sup>

Had Hindus and Muslims a common religion and had they forgotten their history, a common nation may have emerged, but Hinduism and Islam are each other's antithesis and the past of Hindus and Muslims has become a part of their religious lore. Thus, for them, to forget the past is to discard their religion. This has been impossible because, as Kingsley Davis says, it will be impossible to find two religions more contradictory than Hinduism and Islam. Islam emphasizes unity: of God, of the revealed book; Hinduism multiplicity: of gods, of scriptures. The dogma of Islam is relatively uniform; Hinduism has no form and no uniform dogma. Islam is aggressive and proselytising; Hinduism passive and absorptive. Muslims are beef-eaters; Hindus revere cows. Music is obnoxious to the orthodox Muslim, it is a part of Hindu religious ritual. They have different calendars and different festivals.<sup>6</sup> Complete equality and brotherhood of all believers is basic to Islam; Hinduism is divided into four main castes and innumerable subcastes which traditionally maintain strict segregation among themselves, nothing to say of the exclusion of the non-Hindu.

The basic feature and the foundation of Muslim nationalism, through all the centuries that Muslims have been in India, has been the preservation of the distinct and also separate identity of Muslims as a group.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup> Kingsley Davis, *The Population of India and Pakistan*, Princeton University Press, 1951, p. 195.



Territory enables people to interact upon each other and due to proximity, if nothing else, know and deal with each other if communications are good. More than any other factor, religion has a great hold on the loyalties of people and their sense of identification. In case of group confrontation, if the religion of the victor and the vanquished is the same, or if one accepts the religion of the other, religious discrimination ceases to exist and the scars of the battlefield may be healed by time. A knowledge of one's own history is not necessarily conducive to the development of national bonds. "To forget and—I will venture to say—to get one's history wrong, are essential factors in the making of a nation; and thus the advance of historical studies (including the present one) is often a danger to nationality."<sup>2</sup>

If none of these factors explains the basis of a nation, what then does? Renan has repeatedly emphasized that, while all these factors may help, the basic adhesive that binds people into a nationality and helps make them a nation, is their will.

There exists in man a something which is above language:<sup>3</sup> and that is his will....Man is everything in the formation of this sacred thing that we call a people....A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle.<sup>4</sup>

Renan's exposition is detailed but what stands out is the spiritual element, the soul, which is made by two things, one in the past and the other in the present and the future.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 650.

<sup>3</sup> And for that matter, also above race and territory.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 656-60.



## BASES OF MUSLIM NATIONHOOD

There is no dearth of printed literature on nationality, nationalism and nation, and in the early forties tomes were written in India proving and disproving the nationhood of Muslims. The concept of nation is a modern phenomenon, used to assert the right of various subject groups to independent political existence. History records practically no example up to the Middle Ages of the rights of groups, though, however, nations were formed during that period and even in earlier times.

The most important factor in the formation of a nation is unity. It may be imposed by a conqueror or by deliberate desire on the part of the constituent units, or it may result from general sentiment of the people. If race, language, territory, and religion are common, the bonds of unity grow painlessly and even voluntarily. Race, by itself, does not provide a strong bond and there are practically no pure races left in the world any more. "Language", says the famous Renan, "invites union, without, however, compelling it,"<sup>1</sup> and thus has a motivating force in bringing people together, but by itself it does not necessarily create nations.

<sup>1</sup> E. Renan, *What is a Nation*, 1882, trans. by A. Zimmerman, Oxford, 1939, in W. Ebenstein (ed.), *Modern Political Thought*, Rinehart, New York, 1958, p. 656.



of 1926 lies in the final rupture in the on-again off-again Hindu-Muslim honeymoon whose last phase was given life by the Khilafat Movement. After 1926 Hindus and Muslims were never to agree, never to co-operate and never to trust each other; their mutual bitterness, hostility and suspicion were to remain on the increase till the nerves became too taut to relax and the final break came to be seen as the lesser of the evils.

The end of the Hindu-Muslim honeymoon in 1926 resulted in Muslims charting a course exclusively for themselves. Hindu reaction to this course was equivalent in intensity to the strength of Muslim demands. The assertion of Muslim nationalism, which, in the shape of separate identity, had always been there, though feebly articulated and almost never consciously realized, provoked among Hindus an equally strong reaction. Muslims demanded to be a nation; Hindus asserted that there could only be one nation—Indian—and that various religious and linguistic elements in the country were communities or minorities and no more. The minorities may demand and get certain safeguards, but their claim to separate nationhood could not be accepted. Thus the debate rested on what constitutes a nation and whether that criterion could be applied to Muslims.



## INTRODUCTION

It was only in the last years of the British Raj that the Muslims of India gave expression to their inevitable destiny. The vehicle for their deliverance was the All-India Muslim League, its helmsman, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, and the force that carried the vehicle was Muslim nationalism.

As chief articulator of Muslim aspirations, Jinnah summed up the position of the Muslim League, the final goal of Indian Muslims and his own role when he pronounced that

the ideology of the Muslim League is based on the fundamental principle that Muslims of India are an independent nationality and any attempt to get them to merge their national and political identity and unity will not only be resisted, but, in my opinion, it will be futile for any one to attempt it. We are determined, and let there be no mistake about it, to establish the status of an independent nation and an independent State in this sub-continent.<sup>1</sup>

This study concerns itself with the period 1926-1947 in the life of Muslim nationalism. The significance

<sup>1</sup> All India Muslim League, Madras Session, April 1941, Presidential Speech by Mr. M. A. Jinnah, published by All India Muslim League, Delhi, n. d., p. 7. See Appendix I for the text of the speech.







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correctly the actions, motivations and decisions of the subject. The experience of the author regarding the accessibility of the material available in Pakistan has been discouraging. This is particularly regrettable in view of the scarcity of reading material on Pakistan. If the meaning and significance of Pakistan, if the thinking of Muslims in pre-independence India, the circumstances they were living under, and the reasons for their demand of Pakistan are ever to be properly understood and appreciated, if Pakistan wants to be sympathised with and its basis accepted, then it is necessary that the academic circles of the world should have enough scholarly, standard printed material available for teaching and study.

A very large number of people have been extremely helpful to the author in giving information on the Quaid. The author interviewed about four dozen people in England and many in India and Pakistan to obtain personal glimpses of the Quaid; to them he would like to offer his sincere thanks. The sponsors of the Council for Pakistan Studies deserve particular thanks for their encouragement and offer of facilities for the publication of this work and Miss Suraiya Latif for preparing the Index. I would like to acknowledge the contribution my wife, Regula Qureshi, has made through her incisive editorial pen, patient reading and stimulating criticism of my writings. I owe an infinite debt of gratitude to her which I consider a privilege to record here. In the end I would also like to thank the University of Alberta and my colleagues in the Department of Political Science there for their very generous and ungrudging help in the furtherance of my researches.

Saleem M. M. Qureshi



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## PREFACE

This study was produced in response to an invitation to read a paper on Muslim Nationalism at the Fourth Annual Conference of Asian History at Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, on August 9, 1968. The subject of the study is the political role of Mohammad Ali Jinnah, by far the most or at least one of the most important political personalities of modern India. The politics and personality of Jinnah played the most crucial role in the political developments leading to independence. His was the call for partition and thus his was the achievement that resulted in the emergence of the sovereign State of Pakistan. For some reasons, explicable and inexplicable, this single and momentous act of political creation and the force behind this act—Jinnah—have received scant attention by scholars, though numerous scholarly and other tracts have been produced on the role, personality and contribution of the leaders of the Indian National Congress.

It was with a view to contribute to the completion of the picture of Indian independence and to correct the imbalance of too much written on the Hindu side and too little written on the Muslim side, that the author has undertaken the writing of a political biography of Jinnah. The views contained in this work are but very tentative and preliminary findings which, on the availability of further information and evidence, may be modified when the larger study is published.

Writing a political biography necessitates access to personal records, papers, diaries, letters, etc. as well as interviews with those who had known the subject personally, for the author to interpret and analyse



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**JINNAH**  
**AND**  
**THE MAKING OF A NATION**

*by*  
**SALEEM M. M. QURESHI**

**COUNCIL FOR PAKISTAN STUDIES**

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JINNAH AND THE MAKING OF A NATION







# INDIA, CHINA AND PAKISTAN

by

LATIF AHMED SHERWANI

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Notable in the whole study is the documentation of each statement in footnotes and the further care taken to use only Indian or foreign sources, so that no shadow of doubt on the score of impartiality might arise. The wealth of data drawn upon is impressive in its range, and does great credit to the writer in its judicious selection. The analysis and assessment is marked by scholarly sobriety and considerable insight. *Pakistan Quarterly*, Karachi.

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